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E` valida la clausola compromissoria che fissa, tra i requisiti degli arbitri in-
dicati dalle parti, quello di un particolare credo religioso. Le parti possono vali-
damente stipulare nell’accordo arbitrale che uno o piu` arbitri siano membri di una
data comunita` religiosa.
La nomina di un arbitro la cui appartenenza religiosa non sia quella specifi-
camente indicata e pattuita dalle parti nella clausola compromissoria costituisce
pertanto una violazione dell’accordo arbitrale medesimo.
In un arbitrato transnazionale con sede a Londra non e` applicabile l’Employ-
ment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulation del 2003 in quanto il contratto di ar-
bitrato non e` un contratto di lavoro subordinato o comunque non rientra nella no-
zione di « employment » di cui alla predetta Regulation. Prevale la Sect.1 e l’art.
34 dell’Arbitration Act (1996) e quindi, in materia arbitrale, le parti hanno ampia
autonomia di stabilire in che modo le loro controversie siano risolte, salvi i limiti
dell’ordine pubblico. Non sussiste nel caso di specie motivo di ricorso pregiudiziale
alla Corte di Giustizia UE a fini interpretativi della Direttiva n. 2000/78/CE del
Consiglio, del 27 novembre 2000, che stabilisce un quadro generale per la parita`
di trattamento in materia di occupazione e di condizioni di lavoro vietando, inter
alia, le discriminazioni fondate sulla religione al fine di rendere effettivo il princi-
pio della parita` di trattamento.
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CENNI DI FATTO. — Il 29 gennaio 1981 il sig. Jivraj ed il sig. Hashwani conclu-
dono un accordo di joint venture in cui e` prevista una clausola compromissoria se-
condo la quale tutte le controversie nascenti da quel contratto sarebbero state risolte
in via definitiva da tre arbitri, ciascuno dei quali doveva essere un membro rispet-
tato della comunita` degli ismailiti, comunita` cui appartenevano entrambe le parti al
contratto di joint venture.
All’origine della controversia si colloca la richiesta di una delle parti (Hashwani)
di nominare arbitro Sir Anthony Colman il quale, tuttavia, non era un membro della
comunita` degli ismailiti, richiesta cui si e` opposta la controparte dinanzi alla Commer-
cial Court di Londra. Il giudice di primo grado ha rilevato che il rapporto giuridico
esistente tra ciascun arbitro e le parti in lite non possiede i caratteri del contratto di
lavoro subordinato. Di conseguenza, non si ha in tale fattispecie l’applicazione delle
norme di cui alle Employment Equality Regulations, ossia quelle norme tese a vietare
la discriminazione nel contratto di lavoro, ne´ quelle dello Human Right Act del 1998,
ne´, infine, si ravvisa una violazione dell’ordine pubblico. In ogni caso, rileva lo stesso
giudice, le predette Regulations prevedono alcune eccezioni quali appunto quella del
« genuine occupational requirement » che si applica laddove « essere di una religione
o di una credenza particolare costituisce un requisito professionale ».
La Court of Appeal di Londra, nella sua sentenza del 22 giugno 2010, Jivraj c.
Hashwani, perviene, tuttavia, ad opposte conclusioni: lo statuto dell’arbitro e` assimi-
labile a quello che deriva da un contratto di lavoro ai sensi del diritto inglese in quanto
ha per oggetto una prestazione di servizi. Di conseguenza, sono applicabili al caso di
specie le disposizioni delle predette Employment Equality Regulations del 2003, di-
sposizioni che proibiscono le discriminazioni fondate sulla religione o sulle convin-
zioni personali. Pertanto, la clausola compromissoria de qua e` illecita.
MOTIVI DELLA DECISIONE. — (Omissis).
The JVA
2. The JVA was established to make investments in real estate around the
world. By article 9 it is expressly governed by English law. Article 8 provides, so
far as material, as follows:
« (1) If any dispute difference or question shall at any time hereafter arise be-
tween the investors with respect to the construction of this agreement or concern-
ing anything herein contained or arising out of this agreement or as to the rights
liabilities or duties of the investors or either of them or arising out of (without
limitation) any of the businesses or activities of the joint venture herein agreed the
same (subject to sub-clause 8(5) below) shall be referred to three arbitrators (act-
ing by a majority) one to be appointed by each party and the third arbitrator to be
the President of the HH Aga Khan National Council for the United Kingdom for
the time being. All arbitrators shall be respected members of the Ismaili commu-
nity and holders of high office within the community.
(2) The arbitration shall take place in London and the arbitrators’ award shall
be final and binding on both parties ».
The Ismaili community comprises Shia Imami Ismaili Muslims. It is led by
the Aga Khan, whose title is the hereditary title of the Imam of the Ismaili com-
munity.
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The disputes
3. During the 1980s the joint venture came to comprise substantial business
interests, first in Canada and later in the United States, Pakistan and the United
Kingdom, with investments in properties, hotels and the oil industry. By late 1988
Mr Jivraj and Mr Hashwani had agreed to part company. On 30 October 1988 they
entered into an agreement under which they appointed a three man conciliation
panel (« the panel ») for the purpose of the division of the joint venture assets. Each
member of the panel was a respected member of the Ismaili community. The panel
operated between October 1988 and February 1990 and many of the assets were
divided between the parties in accordance with its directions. It was however un-
able to resolve all the issues between the parties. The parties then agreed to submit
the remaining issues to arbitration or conciliation by a single member of the Ismaili
community, namely Mr Zaher Ahamed. He issued a determination in December
1993, whereafter he had further exchanges with the parties until 1995, when he de-
clared himself defeated.
4. The principal matters which remained in dispute were, on the one hand, a
claim by Mr Hashwani that there remained a balance due to him and, on the other
hand, a claim by Mr Jivraj that Mr Hashwani had failed to declare certain tax li-
abilities which left Mr Jivraj with a potential for secondary liability. These matters
remained in dispute for some years. Then, on 31 July 2008, Messrs Zaiwalla & Co,
acting on behalf of Mr Hashwani, wrote to Mr Jivraj asserting a claim for
US$1,412,494, together with interest, compounded quarterly from 1994, making a
total of US$4,403,817. The letter gave notice that Mr Hashwani had appointed Sir
Anthony Colman as an arbitrator under article 8 of the JVA and that, if Mr Jivraj
failed to appoint an arbitrator within seven days, steps would be taken to appoint
Sir Anthony as sole arbitrator. The letter added that Mr Hashwani did not regard
himself as bound by the provision that the arbitrators should be members of the Is-
maili community because such a requirement « would now amount to religious
discrimination which would violate the Human Rights Act 1998 and therefore must
be regarded as void ». It is common ground, on the one hand, that Sir Anthony
Colman is not a member of the Ismaili community and, on the other hand, that he
is a retired judge of the Commercial Court with substantial experience of the reso-
lution of commercial disputes, both as a judge and as an arbitrator.
5. Mr Jivraj’s response to the letter was to start proceedings in the Commercial
Court seeking a declaration that the appointment of Sir Anthony was invalid because
he is not a member of the Ismaili community. Mr Hashwani subsequently issued an
arbitration claim form seeking an order that Sir Anthony be appointed sole arbitrator
pursuant to section 18(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (« the 1996 Act »). The applica-
tion was made on the basis that the requirement that the arbitrators be members of the
Ismaili community, although lawful when the agreement was made, had been rendered
unlawful and was void because it contravened the Regulations.
The Regulations
6. The Regulations were made in the exercise of powers conferred by the Eu-
ropean Communities Act 1972 following the making of the Council Framework
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Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 (OJ 2000 L303, p 16) (« the Direc-
tive ») which, by article 1, was itself made for the purpose of establishing: « a gen-
eral framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief,
disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation, with a
view to putting into effect in the member states the principle of equal treatment ».
7. The Regulations (as amended by section 77(2) of the Equality Act 2006)
provide, so far as material, as follows:
« 2 Interpretation...
(3) In these Regulations... references to “employer”, in their application to a
person at any time seeking to employ another, include a person who has no em-
ployees at that time; “employment” means employment under a contract of service
or of apprenticeship or a contract personally to do any work, and related expres-
sions shall be construed accordingly...;
3 Discrimination on grounds of religion or belief
(1) For the purposes of these Regulations, a person (“A”) discriminates
against another person (“B”) if —
(a) on the grounds of the religion or belief of B or of any other person except
A (whether or not it is also A’s religion or belief), A treats B less favourably than
he treats or would treat other persons;
6 Applicants and employees
(1) It is unlawful for an employer, in relation to employment by him at an es-
tablishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against a person —
(a) in the arrangements he makes for the purpose of determining to whom he
should offer employment;
(b) in the terms on which he offers that person employment; or
(c) by refusing to offer, or deliberately not offering, him employment.
7 Exception for genuine occupational requirement
(1) In relation to discrimination falling within regulation 3 (discrimination on
grounds of religion or belief) —
(a) regulation 6(1)(a) or (c) does not apply to any employment... where para-
graph (2) or (3) applies.
(2) This paragraph applies where, having regard to the nature of the employ-
ment or the context in which it is carried out —
(a) being of a particular religion or belief is a genuine and determining occu-
pational requirement;
(b) it is proportionate to apply that requirement in the particular case; and
(c) either — (i) the person to whom that requirement is applied does not meet
it, or (ii) the employer is not satisfied, and in all the circumstances it is reasonable
for him not to be satisfied, that that person meets it, and this paragraph applies
whether or not the employer has an ethos based on religion or belief.
(3) This paragraph applies where an employer has an ethos based on religion
or belief and, having regard to that ethos and to the nature of the employment or
the context in which it is carried out —
(a) being of a particular religion or belief is a genuine occupational require-
ment for the job;
(b) it is proportionate to apply that requirement in the particular case; and
(c) either — (i) the person to whom that requirement is applied does not meet
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it, or (ii) the employer is not satisfied, and in all the circumstances it is reasonable
for him not to be satisfied, that that person meets it ».
The Directive
8. It is common ground that the Regulations must, so far as possible, be con-
strued to give effect to the objective of the Directive which they were designed to
implement: see eg Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion
SA (Case C-106/89) [1990] ECR I-4135 and Litster v Forth Dry Dock & Engineer-
ing Co Ltd [1990] 1 AC 546. It is also common ground that, although the arbitra-
tion agreement was on any view lawful when it was made, it became subject to the
provisions of the Regulations, insofar as they applied to it.
9. The Directive provides, so far as material, as follows:
« Article 1 - Purpose
The purpose of this Directive is to lay down a general framework for combat-
ing discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual ori-
entation as regards employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect
in the member states the principle of equal treatment.
Article 2 - Concept of discrimination
(1) For the purposes of this Directive, the “principle of equal treatment” shall
mean that there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination whatsoever on any of
the grounds referred to in article 1.
...
Article 3 - Scope
(1) Within the limits of the areas of competence conferred on the Community,
this Directive shall apply to all persons, as regards both the public and private sec-
tors, including public bodies, in relation to
(a) conditions for access to employment, to self-employment or to occupation,
including selection criteria and recruitment conditions, whatever the branch of ac-
tivity and at all levels of the professional hierarchy, including promotion;
(b) access to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance, vocational
training, advanced vocational training and retraining, including practical work ex-
perience;
(c) employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay;
(d) membership of, and involvement in, an organisation of workers or em-
ployers, or any organisation whose members
carry on a particular profession, including the benefits
provided for by such organisations ».
10. As Moore-Bick LJ, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, observed at
para 8, the Directive is concerned with discrimination on the grounds of religion or
belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. It is therefore much wider in its scope
than the Regulations, which are concerned only with discrimination on the grounds of
religion or belief. The explanation lies in the fact that the United Kingdom had already
introduced legislation dealing with discrimination on most of the other grounds cov-
ered by the Directive in connection with employment and occupation.
Discrimination on the grounds of sex was rendered unlawful by the Sex Dis-
crimination Act 1975 (« the SDA 1975 »), discrimination on the grounds of race by
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the Race Relations Acts 1968 and 1976, discrimination on the grounds of disabil-
ity by the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. Legislation dealing with discrimina-
tion on the grounds of age, sexual orientation and religion or belief was still
required to ensure compliance with the Directive. The Regulations deal with dis-
crimination on the grounds of religion or belief. The Employment Equality (Sexual
Orientation) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/1661) provided for discrimination on the
grounds of sexual orientation, and discrimination on the grounds of age was sub-
sequently covered by the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006.
11. Again as observed by the Court of Appeal (at para 9), the form of the
Regulations follows closely that of the earlier legislation, in particular in defining
« employment » as including a contract personally to do work of any kind.
Moreover, the language of regulation 6 is identical to, or differs in no signifi-
cant respect from, that used in the other legislation dealing with discrimination. It
follows that the Regulations must be understood as complementing all the other
legislation prohibiting discrimination.
12. This uniformity of the law relating to the areas in which discrimination is
forbidden has now been reinforced by the Equality Act 2010 (« the EA »), which
applies to all of the cases protected by the earlier legislation. The EA is, among
other things, an Act « to reform and harmonise equality law and restate the greater
part of the enactments relating to discrimination ». The Regulations were amongst
those enactments restated by the EA. They were revoked by section 211 and
Schedule 27, Part 2. The revocation took effect on 1 October 2010. The current law
is therefore as stated in the Act rather than the Regulations. It was not however
suggested in the course of the argument that any of the issues in this appeal is af-
fected by the revocation of the Regulations.
First instance
13. Both parties’ applications were determined by David Steel J (« the
judge ») on 26 June 2009: see [2009] EWHC 1364 (Comm), [2010] 1 All ER 302.
In the meantime on 11 March 2009, which was before the applications were heard,
the solicitors for Mr Jivraj wrote an open letter to the solicitors for Mr Hashwani
offering him the option of pursuing his claim in the High Court on the basis that
Mr Jivraj would not seek a stay on the basis of the arbitration clause. Mr Hashwani
did not accept the offer.
14. It was submitted before the judge on behalf of Mr Hashwani that the term
requiring arbitrators to be members of the Ismaili community was invalid by rea-
son of one or more of the following: the Regulations, the Human Rights Act 1998
(« the HRA »), or public policy at common law. The judge held (i) that the term
did not constitute unlawful discrimination on any of those bases and, specifically,
that arbitrators were not « employed » within the meaning of the Regulations; (ii)
that if, nonetheless, appointment of arbitrators fell within the scope of the Regula-
tions, it was demonstrated that one of the more significant characteristics of the Is-
maili sect was an enthusiasm for dispute resolution within the Ismaili community,
that this was an « ethos based on religion » within the meaning of the Regulations
and that the requirement for the arbitrators to be members of the Ismaili commu-
nity constituted a genuine occupational requirement which it was proportionate to
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apply within regulation 7(3); and (iii) that, if that was also wrong, the requirement
was not severable from the arbitration provision as a whole, so that the whole ar-
bitration clause would be void. The judge ordered Mr Hashwani to pay Mr Jivraj’s
costs and refused Mr Hashwani’s application for permission to appeal.
The Court of Appeal
15. On 7 October 2009 Sir Richard Buxton granted permission to appeal lim-
ited to the issues on the Regulations and on severance. Permission was refused on
the HRA and public policy issues. The issues in the Court of Appeal were there-
fore these:
i) Are arbitrators persons who are under a contract to do work so as to fall
within the Regulations and, if so, do parties who make an arbitration agreement
specifying religious qualifications for eligible arbitrators thereby make an arrange-
ment for the purpose of determining to whom they should offer employment or do
they agree to offer, or deliberately not to offer, employment within the meaning of
the Regulations?
ii) If so, in the circumstances, did the requirement for all the arbitrators to be
members of the Ismaili community constitute a genuine occupational requirement
(« GOR ») which it was proportionate to apply within regulation 7(3)?
iii) If not, did the whole arbitration agreement fail or was only the discrimi-
natory provision void?
16. The unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeal, which comprised
Moore-Bick and Aikens LJJ and Sir Richard Buxton, was handed down on 22 June
2010: see [2010] EWCA Civ 712, [2010] ICR 1435. The Court of Appeal reached
a different conclusion from the judge on the principal points. It held that the ap-
pointment of an arbitrator involved a contract for the provision of services which
constituted « a contract personally to do any work », and therefore satisfied the
definition of « employment » in regulation 2(3). It followed that the appointor was
an « employer » within the meaning of regulation 6(1) and that the restriction of
eligibility for appointment as an arbitrator to members of the Ismaili community
constituted unlawful discrimination on religious grounds, both in making « arrange-
ments... for the purpose of determining to whom he should offer employment »
contrary to regulation 6(1)(a), and by « refusing to offer, or deliberately not offer-
ing » employment contrary to regulation 6(1)(c). The Court of Appeal further held
that being a member of the Ismaili community was not « a genuine occupational
requirement for the job » within the meaning of the exception in regulation 7(3). It
is submitted on behalf of Mr Jivraj that both those conclusions were wrong.
17. Finally the Court of Appeal held that, although there would be no diffi-
culty in operating the agreement if the offending requirement was struck out, so
doing would render the agreement substantially different from that originally in-
tended, the term was void in its entirety under paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 4 to the
Regulations and Mr Hashwani’s nomination of an arbitrator was invalid. It is sub-
mitted on behalf of Mr Hashwani that both the judge and the Court of Appeal were
wrong on this point, which I will call « the severance issue ».
18. A further point arises out of the Court of Appeal’s order on costs if its
judgment is upheld on each of the above points.
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Employment
19. The reasoning of the Court of Appeal was straightforward: see paras 15-
17. In short the Court of Appeal drew attention to the wide terms of articles 1 and
3 of the Directive. In particular it noted at para 15 that the recitals to the Directive
and the structure and language of article 3(1) as a whole indicate that it is con-
cerned with discrimination affecting access to the means of economic activity,
whether through employment, self-employment or some other basis of occupation,
access to vocational guidance and training (which can be expected to provide a
means of access to economic activity), conditions of employment (which affect
those who have gained access to a means of economic activity) and membership of
bodies whose purpose is to affect conditions of recruitment or employment or to
regulate access to a particular form of economic activity, such as professional bod-
ies that directly or indirectly control access to the profession or a significant means
of obtaining work.
20. The Court of Appeal then said at para 16:
« The paradigm case of appointing an arbitrator involves obtaining the ser-
vices of a particular person to determine a dispute in accordance with the agree-
ment between the parties and the rules of law, including those to be found in the
legislation governing arbitration. In that respect it is no different from instructing a
solicitor to deal with a particular piece of legal business, such as drafting a will, or
consulting a doctor about a particular ailment or an accountant about a tax return.
Since an arbitrator (or any professional person) contracts to do work personally, the
provision of his services falls within the definition of “employment”, and it follows
that his appointor must be an employer within the meaning of regulation 6(1)... ».
21. In paras 16 and 17 it placed reliance on three cases. It relied upon von
Hoffmann v Finanzamt Trier (Case C-145/96) [1997] All ER (EC) 852 as showing
that arbitrators had been treated as providing services for VAT purposes. It also re-
ferred to domestic regulations relating to goods and services. It further derived
support from Kelly v Northern Ireland Housing Executive [1999] 1 AC 428 and
from Percy v Board of National Mission of the Church of Scotland [2005] UKHL
73, [2006] 2 AC 28. It recognised that those cases were addressing slightly differ-
ent points but concluded that they illustrate the width of the expression « a contract
personally to do any work » in the various discrimination statutes. It concluded thus
in para 17:
« They confirm our view that the expression is apt to encompass the position
of a person who provides services as an arbitrator, and why we think the judge was
wrong to hold that the nature of the arbitrator’s function takes his appointment out-
side the scope of the 2003 Regulations. Moreover, a contract of that kind, once
made, is a contract of employment within the meaning of the 2003 Regulations.
It follows, therefore, that for the purposes of the 2003 Regulations a person
who has entered into a contract under which he is to obtain such services is an em-
ployer and the person engaged to provide them is an employee ».
22. The critical question under this head is whether the Court of Appeal was
correct to form a different view from the judge on this point. In my opinion it was
not. As the Court of Appeal correctly observed at para 15, the meaning of article 3
of the Directive has not been considered by the Court of Justice, and is to be inter-
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preted in the light of the recitals and given its natural meaning consistent with the
EC Treaty and the existing case law of the court.
23. It is common ground, at any rate in this class of case, that there is a con-
tract between the parties and the arbitrator or arbitrators appointed under a contract
and that his or their services are rendered pursuant to that contract. It is not sug-
gested that such a contract provides for « employment under a contract of service
or of apprenticeship ». The question is whether it provides for « employment un-
der... a contract personally to do any work ». There is in my opinion some signifi-
cance in the fact that the definition does not simply refer to a contract to do work
but to « employment under » such a contract. I would answer the question in the
negative on the ground that the role of an arbitrator is not naturally described as
employment under a contract personally to do work. That is because his role is not
naturally described as one of employment at all. I appreciate that there is an ele-
ment of circularity in that approach but the definition is of « employment » and this
approach is consistent with the decided cases.
24. Given the provenance of the Regulations, it is appropriate to consider first
the decisions of the Court of Justice. The most important of these is perhaps Al-
lonby v Accrington and Rossendale College (Case C-256/01) [2004] ICR 1328,
where the Court of Justice followed the principles laid down in Lawrie-Blum v
Land Baden-Wurttemberg (Case C-66/85) [1987] ICR 483 and in Kurz v Land
Baden-Wurttemberg (Case C-188/00) [2002] ECR I-10691. In Lawrie-Blum, which
was concerned with the free movement of « workers » under what was then article
48 of the Treaty, Advocate General Lenz said at para III 2(b) of his opinion that
the term worker covers any employed person who is not self-employed. The court
said at para 17:
« That concept [ie of “worker”] must be defined with objective criteria which
distinguish the employment relationship by reference to the rights and duties of the
persons concerned. The essential feature of an employment relationship, however,
is that for a certain period of time a person performs services for and under the di-
rection of another person in return for which he receives remuneration ».
25. In Kurz the court said at para 32 that it was settled case law that the con-
cept of worker has a specific Community meaning and must not be interpreted nar-
rowly. The court then repeated the essential feature of the relationship identified in
the above passage from Lawrie-Blum.
26. In Allonby the court addressed an equal pay claim by a college lecturer
who had been dismissed by the college and then re-engaged, ostensibly as a self-
employed sub-contractor supplied by an agency. For the purposes of article 141(1)
of the EC Treaty, the court drew a clear distinction between « workers » and « in-
dependent suppliers of services ». It discussed the concept of worker within the
meaning of article 141(1) between paras 62 and 72, which included the following:
« 62. The criterion on which article 141(1) EC is based is the comparability
of the work done by workers of each sex: see, to that effect, Defrenne v Sabena (No
2) (Case 149/77) [1978] ECR 1365, 1377, para 22. Accordingly, for the purpose of
the comparison provided for by article 141(1) EC, only women and men who are
workers within the meaning of that article can be taken into consideration.
63. In that connection, it must be pointed out that there is no single definition
of worker in Community law: it varies according to the area in which the definition
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is to be applied: Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern (Case C-85/96) [1998] ECRI-
2691, 2719, para 31.
64. The term “worker” within the meaning of article 141(1) EC is not ex-
pressly defined in the EC Treaty. It is therefore necessary, in order to determine its
meaning, to apply the generally recognised principles of interpretation, having re-
gard to its context and to the objectives of the Treaty.
65. According to article 2 EC, the Community is to have as its task to pro-
mote, among other things, equality between men and women. Article 141(1) EC
constitutes a specific expression of the principle of equality for men and women,
which forms part of the fundamental principles protected by the Community legal
order: see, to that effect, Deutsche Post AG v Sievers (Cases C-270 and 271/97)
[2000] ECR I-929, 952, para 57. As the court held in Defrenne v Sabena (Case 43/
75) [1976] ICR 547, 566, para 12, the principle of equal pay forms part of the
foundations of the Community.
66. Accordingly, the term “worker” used in article 141(1) EC cannot be de-
fined by reference to the legislation of the member states but has a Community
meaning. Moreover, it cannot be interpreted restrictively.
67. For the purposes of that provision, there must be considered as a worker
a person who, for a certain period of time, performs services for and under the di-
rection of another person in return for which he receives remuneration see, in re-
lation to free movement of workers, in particular Lawrie-Blum... para 17, and Mar-
tinez Sala, para 32.
68. Pursuant to the first paragraph of article 141(2) EC, for the purpose of that
article, “pay” means the ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any other
consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker receives directly or in-
directly, in respect of his employment, from his employer. It is clear from that defi-
nition that the authors of the Treaty did not intend that the term “worker”, within
the meaning of article 141(1) EC, should include independent providers of services
who are not in a relationship of subordination with the person who receives the
services (see also, in the context of free movement of workers, Meeusen v Hoofd-
directie van de Informatie Beheer Groep (Case C-337/97) [1999] ECR I-3289,
3311, para 15).
69. The question whether such a relationship exists must be answered in each
particular case having regard to all the factors and circumstances by which the re-
lationship between the parties is characterised.
70. Provided that a person is a worker within the meaning of article 141(1)
EC, the nature of his legal relationship with the other party to the employment re-
lationship is of no consequence in regard to the application of that article: ...
71. The formal classification of a self-employed person under national law
does not exclude the possibility that a person must be classified as a worker within
the meaning of article 141(1) EC if his independence is merely notional, thereby
disguising an employment relationship within the meaning of that article ».
27. On the basis of those materials I would accept Mr Davies’ submission that
the Court of Justice draws a clear distinction between those who are, in substance,
employed and those who are « independent providers of services who are not in a
relationship of subordination with the person who receives the services ». I see no
reason why the same distinction should not be drawn for the purposes of the Regu-
lations between those who are employed and those who are not notionally but
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genuinely self-employed. In the light of Allonby, there can be no doubt that that
would be the correct approach to the near identical definition in section 1(6) of the
Equal Pay Act 1970 and must remain the correct approach to the definition of em-
ployment in section 83(2) of the EA, which provides, so far as relevant:
« “Employment” means — (a) employment under a contract of employment,
a contract of apprenticeship or a contract personally to do work; ... ».
That definition is almost identical to the definition in regulation 2(3) of the
Regulations and, since it applies to equal pay issues by virtue of sections 83(4),
80(2) and 64 of the EA, it must equally apply to the Regulations.
28. In my opinion there is nothing in the domestic authorities which requires
the court to come to any different conclusion. The problem with some of them is
that they do not refer to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. However, the
most recent decision of the House of Lords does. In Percy v Board of National
Mission of the Church of Scotland [2006] 2 AC 28 the House of Lords considered
a sex discrimination claim brought by a woman who was a minister of the Church
of Scotland. The issue was whether she was employed within the meaning of sec-
tion 82(1) of the SDA 1975. The House held that she was. Lord Hoffmann dis-
sented on the basis that she was the holder of an office but had no doubt (at para
66) that, if the arrangement had been contractual, it would plainly have been a con-
tract of service.
29. Lord Hoffmann said at para 73 that the term « workers » is a term of art
in Community law which was defined by the Court of Justice in the passage from
para 17 of Lawrie-Blum quoted at para 24 above. Lord Hope of Craighead said
much the same at para 126, where he also noted that the same approach was taken
in Allonby.
30. Baroness Hale of Richmond referred at para 141 to para A[4] of Harvey
on Industrial Relations and Employment Law, which stated that: « the distinction is
between those who work for themselves and those who work for others, regardless
of the nature of the contract under which they are employed ».
She then referred at para 143 to the decision of the Court of Appeal in North-
ern Ireland in Perceval-Price v Department of Economic Development [2000]
IRLR 380, where it was held that three full-time judicial office holders, namely a
fulltime chairman of industrial tribunals, a full-time chairman of social security ap-
peal tribunals and a social security commissioner were workers for the purposes of
almost identical provisions.
31. In para 145, after quoting the definition of an employment relationship in
Lawrie-Blum, Baroness Hale noted that, in giving the judgment of the court in Per-
ceval-Price, Sir Robert Carswell LCJ said that the objective of the relevant EC
legislation was to give protection against inequality and discrimination to those
who might be vulnerable to exploitation. He also said that the concept of a worker
should be construed purposively by reference to this objective. Baroness Hale then
quoted this extract from the judgment of Sir Robert Carswell:
« All judges, at whatever level, share certain common characteristics. They all
must enjoy independence of decision without direction from any source, which the
respondents quite rightly defended as an essential part of their work. They all need
some organisation of their sittings, whether it be prescribed by the president of the
industrial tribunals or the court service, or more loosely arranged in collegiate
fashion between the judges of a particular court. They are all expected to work
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during defined times and periods, whether they be rigidly laid down or managed
by the judges themselves with a greater degree of flexibility. They are not free
agents to work as and when they choose, as are self-employed persons. Their office
accordingly partakes of some of the characteristics of employment ».
32. At para 146 Baroness Hale continued: « I have quoted those words at
length because they illustrate how the essential distinction is, as Harvey says, be-
tween the employed and the self-employed. The fact that the worker has very con-
siderable freedom and independence in how she performs the duties of her office
does not take her outside the definition. Judges are servants of the law, in the sense
that the law governs all that they do and decide, just as clergy are servants of God,
in the sense that God’s word, as interpreted in the doctrines of their faith, governs
all that they practise, preach and teach. This does not mean that they cannot be
“workers” or in the “employment” of those who decide how their ministry should
be put to the service of the Church ».
33. Some consideration was recently given to the position of part-time judges
by this court in O’Brien v Ministry of Justice (Note) [2010] UKSC 34, [2010] 4 All
ER 62 where the court considered Percy in some detail in a judgment of the court
given by Lord Walker. At para 25 it referred to the same passage in Lawrie-Blum
as having laid down the relevant principle and at para 26 it referred to the speech
of Baroness Hale and approved the passage quoted above from the judgment of Sir
Robert Carswell in Perceval-Price.
34. As I read Percy, it sought to apply the principles identified by the Court
of Justice, as indeed did this court in O’Brien [2010] 4 All ER 62. The essential
questions in each case are therefore those identified in paras 67 and 68 of Allonby
[2004] ICR 1328, namely whether, on the one hand, the person concerned performs
services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he or she
receives remuneration or, on the other hand, he or she is an independent provider
of services who is not in a relationship of subordination with the person who re-
ceives the services. Those are broad questions which depend upon the circum-
stances of the particular case. They depend upon a detailed consideration of the re-
lationship between the parties. As I see it, that is what Baroness Hale meant when
she said that the essential difference is between the employed and the selfemployed.
The answer will depend upon an analysis of the substance of the matter hav-
ing regard to all the circumstances of the case. I would not accept the Court of Ap-
peal’s analysis (at para 21) of Baroness Hale’s speech in this regard.
35. There have been a number of domestic cases which say that the question
is whether the dominant purpose of the contract is the execution of personal work
or labour: see eg Quinnen v Hovells [1984] ICR 525, Mirror Group Newspapers
Ltd v Gunning [1986] 1 WLR 546, especially per Oliver LJ at 551H and Balcombe
LJ at 556H; Kelly v Northern Ireland Housing Executive [1999] 1 AC 428 and
Percy [2006] 2 AC 28 per Lord Hope at para 113, where he referred to two other
cases in the Court of Appeal, namely Patterson v Legal Services Commission
[2004] ICR 312 and Mingeley v Pennock (trading as Amber Cars) [2004] ICR 727.
Mr. Michael Brindle QC also referred on behalf of the respondent to two earlier
cases which focus on the question whether a contract is one « personally to execute
any work or labour »: see Tanna v Post Offıce [1981] ICR 374 and Hugh-Jones v
St John’s College, Cambridge [1979] ICR 848. However, none of these cases con-
sidered the approach in the decisions of the Court of Justice referred to above.
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36. In particular, the cases did not focus on the fact that the « employment »
must be employment under a contract of employment, a contract of apprenticeship
or a contract personally to do work. (My emphasis). Given the importance of the
EC perspective in construing the legislation, including the Regulations, the cases
must now be read in the light of those decisions. They show that it is not sufficient
to ask simply whether the contract was a contract personally to do work. They also
show that dominant purpose is not the test, or at any rate not the sole test.
37. That is not to say that the question of purpose is irrelevant but the focus
is on the contract and relationship between the parties rather than exclusively on
purpose. Elias J, sitting as President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, recogn-
ised some of the difficulties in James v Redcats (Brands) Ltd [2007] ICR 1006. He
discussed the relevance of dominant purpose in this context by reference to the
cases at paras 53 to 68. At para 59, after quoting from the judgment of Balcombe
LJ in Gunning [1986] 1 WLR 546, he said that the dominant purpose test is really
an attempt to identify the essential nature of the contract. In the context of the case
he was considering he posed the question whether it was in essence to be located
in the field of dependent work relationships or whether it was in essence a contract
between two independent business undertakings.
38. At paras 67 and 68, after referring to a number of cases and observing at
para 65 that the description of the test as one of identifying the dominant purpose
was perhaps not an altogether happy one, he said this:
« 67. An alternative way of putting it may be to say that the courts are seek-
ing to discover whether the obligation for personal service is the dominant feature
of the contractual arrangement or not. If it is, then the contract lies in the employ-
ment field; if it is not — if, for example, the dominant feature of the contract is a
particular outcome or objective — and the obligation to provide personal service is
an incidental or secondary consideration, it will lie in the business field.
68. This is not to suggest that a tribunal will be in error in failing specifically
to apply the “dominant purpose” or indeed any other test. The appropriate classifi-
cation will in every case depend upon a careful analysis of all the elements of the
relationship, as Mr Recorder Underhill QC pointed out in Byrne Bros (Formwork)
Ltd v Baird [2002] ICR 667. It is a fact sensitive issue, and there is no shortcut to
a considered assessment of all relevant factors. However, in some cases the appli-
cation of the “dominant purpose” test may help tribunals to decide which side of
the boundary a particular case lies ».
39. It is noteworthy that the European cases were not cited in many of the
cases, including that before Elias J. In the light of the European cases, dominant
purpose cannot be the sole test, although it may well be relevant in arriving at the
correct conclusion on the facts of a particular case. After all, if the dominant pur-
pose of the contract is the execution of personal work, it seems likely that the re-
lationship will be, in the words of Allonby [2004] ICR 1328, para 67, a case in
which the person concerned performs services for and under the direction of the
other party to the contract in return for remuneration as opposed to an independent
provider of services who is not in a relationship of subordination with him or it.
This may not be so however because, although the dominant purpose of the
contract may be personal work, it may not be personal work under the direction of
the other party to the contract. All will depend upon the applications of the prin-
ciples in Allonby to the circumstances of the particular case.
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40. If the approach in Allonby is applied to a contract between the parties to
an arbitration and the arbitrator (or arbitrators), it is in my opinion plain that the
arbitrators’ role is not one of employment under a contract personally to do work.
Although an arbitrator may be providing services for the purposes of VAT and
he of course receives fees for his work, and although he renders personal services
which he cannot delegate, he does not perform those services or earn his fees for
and under the direction of the parties as contemplated in para 67 of Allonby. He is
rather in the category of an independent provider of services who is not in a rela-
tionship of subordination with the parties who receive his services, as described in
para 68.
41. The arbitrator is in critical respects independent of the parties. His func-
tions and duties require him to rise above the partisan interests of the parties and
not to act in, or so as to further, the particular interests of either party. As the In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce (« the ICC ») puts it, he must determine how to
resolve their competing interests. He is in no sense in a position of subordination
to the parties; rather the contrary. He is in effect a « quasi-judicial adjudicator »:
K/S Norjarl A/S v Hyundai Heavy Industries Co Ltd [1992] QB 863, 885.
42. In England his role is spelled out in the 1996 Act. By section 33, he has
a duty to act fairly and impartially as between the parties and to adopt procedures
suitable to the circumstances of the particular case so as to provide a fair means of
determination of the issues between the parties. Section 34 provides that, subject to
the right of the parties to agree any matter, it is for the arbitrator to decide all pro-
cedural matters. Examples of the width of those powers can be seen in the particu-
lar examples in section 34(2). Section 40 provides that the parties shall do all things
necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct of the arbitration, which includes
complying with any order of the arbitrator, whether procedural or otherwise. Once
an arbitrator has been appointed, at any rate in the absence of agreement between
them, the parties effectively have no control over him. Unless the parties agree, an
arbitrator may only be removed in exceptional circumstances: see sections 23 and
24. The court was referred to many other statutory provisions in other parts of the
world and indeed many other international codes, including the UNCITRAL
(United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) Model Law on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration 1985, the ICC Rules and the London Court of Inter-
national Arbitration (« the LCIA ») Rules to similar effect.
43. The Regulations themselves include provisions which would be wholly
inappropriate as between the parties and the arbitrator or arbitrators. For example,
regulation 22(1) provides: « Anything done by a person in the course of his em-
ployment shall be treated for the purposes of these Regulations as done by his em-
ployer as well as by him, whether or not it was done with the employer’s knowl-
edge or approval ». It is evident that such a provision could not apply to an arbi-
trator.
44. In this regard an arbitrator is in a very different position from a judge. The
precise status of a judge was left open by this court in O’Brien [2010] 4 All ER 62,
in which the court referred particular questions to the Court of Justice: see para 41.
However, as Sir Robert Carswell said in Perceval-Price [2000] IRLR 380 and Lord
Walker said in O’Brien (at para 27), judges, including both recorders and all judges
at every level are subject to terms of service of various kinds. As Sir Robert put it,
although judges must enjoy independence of decision without direction from any
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source, they are in other respects not free agents to work as and when they choose,
as are self-employed persons.
45. In both those cases the court was considering the relationship between the
relevant department of state and the judges concerned. It was not considering the
relationship between the judges and the litigants who appear before them. Here, by
contrast, the court is considering the relationship between the parties to the arbitra-
tion on the one hand and the arbitrator or arbitrators on the other. As I see it, there
is no basis upon which it could properly be held that the arbitrators agreed to work
under the direction of the parties as contemplated in para 67 of Allonby [2004] ICR
1328. Further, in so far as dominant purpose is relevant, I would hold that the
dominant purpose of appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators is the impartial resolu-
tion of the dispute between the parties in accordance with the terms of the agree-
ment and, although the contract between the parties and the arbitrators would be a
contract for the provision of personal services, they were not personal services un-
der the direction of the parties.
46. In reaching this conclusion it is not necessary to speculate upon what the
position might be in other factual contexts. It was submitted that the effect of the
decision of the Court of Appeal is that a customer who engages a person on a one
off contract as, say, a plumber, would be subject to the whole gamut of discrimina-
tion legislation. It would indeed be surprising if that were the case, especially given
the fact that the travaux pre´paratoires contained no such suggestion: see the impact
assessment in the Commission’s Proposal for the Directive 1999/0225 (CNS),
Brussels 1999, which was concerned solely with the position of enterprises of vari-
ous types. There was no consideration of the effect on individual choice by custom-
ers. See also a memorandum from the Commission’s Director General for Employ-
ment and Social Affairs to the EU Committee of the House of Lords dated 9 Feb-
ruary 2000 to much the same effect. This is not to say that the Regulations may not
apply in the case of the plumber, solicitor, accountant or doctor referred to by the
Court of Appeal in para 16. As already stated, all will depend upon the application
of the principles in Allonby to the particular case. As I see it, the problem with the
approach adopted by the Court of Appeal is that it focuses only on the question
whether there is a contract to do work personally, whereas it is necessary to ask the
more nuanced questions identified in Allonby.
(Omissis).
49. Some reliance was placed upon the reference to the « conditions for ac-
cess to employment, to self-employment or to occupation, including selection cri-
teria and recruitment conditions » in article 3(1)(a) of the Directive. In para 20 the
Court of Appeal gave a wide construction to that provision, rejecting the submis-
sion made by Mr Davies that it related to barriers to entry to trades, professions and
occupations. It did so on the same footing as before, namely that a wide meaning
should be given to the terms of the Directive and, in any event, to the Regulations.
However, I would accept Mr Davies’ submission that the expression « access... to
self-employment or to occupation » means what it says and is concerned with pre-
venting discrimination from qualifying or setting up as a solicitor, plumber, green-
grocer or arbitrator. It is not concerned with discrimination by a customer who pre-
fers to contract with one of their competitors once they have set up in business.
That would not be denying them « access... to self-employment or to occupation ».
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I see no reason to give a different meaning to the Regulations from that given to
the Directive.
50. For these reasons I prefer the conclusion of the judge to that of the Court
of Appeal. I agree with the judge that the Regulations are not applicable to the se-
lection, engagement or appointment of arbitrators. It follows that I would hold that
no part of clause 8 of the JVA is invalid by reason of the Regulations and would
allow the appeal on this ground.
Genuine occupational requirement
51. If the above conclusion is correct, this point does not arise but it was fully
argued and I will briefly consider it. The question considered by the judge was
whether, if regulation 6(1)(a) or (c) would otherwise apply, it is prevented from ap-
plying by regulation 7(1) and (3). It will be recalled that, by regulation 7(1), regu-
lations 6(1)(a) and (c) do not apply where regulation 7(3) applies and that regula-
tion 7(3) provides: « This paragraph applies where an employer has an ethos based
on religion or belief and, having regard to that ethos and to the nature of the em-
ployment or the context in which it is carried out —
(a) being of a particular religion or belief is a genuine occupational require-
ment for the job;
(b) it is proportionate to apply that requirement in the particular case; and
(c) either —
(i) the person to whom that requirement is applied does not meet it, or
(ii) the employer is not satisfied, and in all the circumstances it is reasonable
for him not to be satisfied, that that person meets it ».
52. Those provisions were made in accordance with the exceptions in relation
to occupational requirements made by article 4 of the Directive, which provides:
« 1. Notwithstanding article 2(1) and (2), member states may provide that a
difference of treatment which is based on a characteristic related to any of the
grounds referred to in article 1 shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason
of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in
which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and deter-
mining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the
requirement is proportionate ».
2. Member states may maintain national legislation in force at the date of
adoption of this Directive or provide for future legislation incorporating national
practices existing at the date of adoption of this Directive pursuant to which, in the
case of occupational activities within churches and other public or private organi-
sations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, a difference of treatment
based on a person’s religion or belief shall not constitute discrimination where, by
reason of the nature of these activities or of the context in which they are carried
out, a person’s religion or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate and justified occu-
pational requirement, having regard to the organisation’s ethos. This difference of
treatment shall be implemented taking account of members states’ constitutional
provisions and principles, as well as the general principles of Community law, and
should not justify discrimination on another ground... ».
53. It is common ground that, as the judge said at para 40, a rigorous and
636
strict approach must be adopted to the question whether the particular exception
applies: Stadt Halle v Arbeitgemeinschaft Thermische Restabfall-und Energieverw-
ertungsanlage TREA Leuna (Case C-26/03) [2005] ECR I-1 and Marleasing [1990]
ECR I-4135.
54. Although some reliance was placed in the course of argument on regula-
tion 7(2), I shall focus first on paragraph (3). Since 1 October 2010 the provisions
of regulation 7 have been replaced by those of Schedule 9 of the EA. Regulation
7(3) has been replaced by paragraph (3) of that Schedule, which provides:
« A person (A) with an ethos based on religion or belief does not contravene
a provision mentioned in paragraph 1(2) by applying in relation to work a require-
ment to be of a particular religion or belief if A shows that, having regard to that
ethos and the nature or context of the work —
(a) it is an occupational requirement,
(b) the application of the requirement is a proportionate means of achieving a
legitimate aim, and the person to whom A applies the requirement does not meet it
(or A has reasonable grounds for not being satisfied that the person meets it) ».
It was not suggested that there is any significant difference between that para-
graph and regulation 7(3).
55. There are four relevant requirements under regulation 7(3). The issue be-
tween the parties centres upon whether the second requirement is satisfied. The re-
quirements are (1) that the employer should have an ethos based on religion or be-
lief; (2) that, having regard to that ethos and to the nature of the employment or
the context in which it is carried out, being of a particular religion or belief is a
genuine requirement for the job; (3) that, having regard to that ethos and to the na-
ture of the employment or the context in which it is carried out, it is proportionate
to apply that requirement on the facts; and (4) that the person to whom the require-
ment is applied, who here must be Sir Anthony Colman, does not meet the require-
ment.
56. As to (1) it is not (and could not be) suggested here that Mr Jivraj and Mr
Hashwani did not have such an ethos. As to (3), it is not in dispute that, if require-
ment (2) is satisfied, so that being an Ismaili is a genuine occupational requirement,
it is or would be proportionate to apply it. As to (4), it is plain that Sir Anthony
Colman does not meet the requirement in the JVA that the arbitrators should be
members of the Ismaili community. The essential issue between the parties is
whether requirement (2) is satisfied. The question is therefore whether, having re-
gard to the Ismaili ethos and to the nature of the employment or the context in
which it is carried out, being of the Ismaili religion or belief is a genuine require-
ment for the job. The judge held that this requirement was satisfied whereas the
Court of Appeal held that it was not.
57. Our attention was drawn on behalf of Mr Jivraj to what is said to be an
important difference between paragraphs (2) and (3) of regulation 7. Paragraph (2)
is concerned with the case where the employer does not have a particular ethos
based on religion or belief but wishes to recruit a worker who does have such an
ethos. In that event, for the exception to apply, being of the particular ethos or be-
lief must be a « genuine and determining occupational requirement ». By contrast,
where (as here) the employer has an ethos based on religion or belief, it is suffi-
cient under paragraph (3) that being of a particular religion or belief is « a genuine
occupational requirement for the job ».
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58. Mr Davies submits that the difference between the two cases is this. In the
first case the question is whether being of a particular religion or belief is a « genu-
ine and determining occupational requirement ». That is to say it must be an essen-
tial requirement for the job. Whether it is or not is an objective question which the
court can readily decide. In the second case, on the other hand, the question for the
court is subjective, namely whether it is a genuine requirement for the job in the
eyes of the employer or employers. This, Mr Davies suggests, reflects the sensible
principle that it is not for the court to sit in judgment over matters of religion or
belief. By contrast, Mr Brindle disputes the idea that the test is entirely subjective.
Regulation 7(3) requires that being of a particular religion or belief is not only
genuine but also, as paragraph 2 of article 4 of the Directive shows, « legitimate
and justified ». It follows that it is not sufficient that the employer has a genuine
belief that the particular religion or belief is required. The requirement must also
be legitimate and justified. It would be remarkable, in his submission, if the justi-
fication could be found in the personal opinions of the prima facie discriminator.
59. I agree with Mr Davies that it is not for the court to sit in judgment on
matters of religion or belief. However, I also agree with Mr Brindle that the test
for justifying prima facie discrimination cannot be entirely subjective. This is be-
cause the Regulations must be construed consistently with the Directive. It seems
to me to be reasonably clear that paragraph 1 of article 4 of the Directive is the
source of paragraph (2) of regulation 7 because they both refer to a genuine and
determining occupational requirement. In these circumstances paragraph 2 must be
the source of paragraph (3) of the regulation, with the result that the expression
« genuine occupational requirement » must (either alone or together with propor-
tionality in requirement (3)) have been intended to reflect the expression « genuine,
legitimate and justified occupational requirement » in paragraph 2 of article 4 of the
Directive. If the legitimacy or justification of a requirement were assessed purely
by reference to the subjective view of the employer, they would add nothing to the
stipulation that a requirement be genuine. In my view, whether or not a particular
religion or belief is a legitimate and justified requirement of an occupation is an
objective question for the court. This is not however as strict a test as that applied
under regulation 7(2), namely that a particular religion or belief is an essential re-
quirement for the job. As I see it, the question is simply whether in all the circum-
stances of the case the requirement that the arbitrators should be respected mem-
bers of the Ismaili community was, not only genuine, but legitimate and justified.
60. I do not agree with Mr Brindle that the requirement that arbitrators be Is-
mailis cannot be objectively justified. His submission that an English law dispute
in London under English curial law does not require an Ismaili arbitrator takes a
very narrow view of the function of arbitration proceedings. This characterisation
reduces arbitration to no more than the application of a given national law to a dis-
pute.
61. One of the distinguishing features of arbitration that sets it apart from
proceedings in national courts is the breadth of discretion left to the parties and the
arbitrator to structure the process for resolution of the dispute. This is reflected in
section 1 of the 1996 Act which provides that: « the parties should be free to agree
how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in
the public interest ». The stipulation that an arbitrator be of a particular religion or
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belief can be relevant to this aspect of arbitration. As the ICC puts in its written
argument:
« The raison d’eˆtre of arbitration is that it provides for final and binding dis-
pute resolution by a tribunal with a procedure that is acceptable to all parties, in
circumstances where other fora (in particular national courts) are deemed inappro-
priate (eg because neither party will submit to the courts or their counterpart; or
because the available courts are considered insufficiently expert for the particular
dispute, or insufficiently sensitive to the parties’ positions, culture, or perspec-
tives) ».
62. Under section 34 of the 1996 Act (referred to above) the arbitrators have
complete power over all procedural and evidential matters, including how far the
proceedings should be oral or in writing, whether or not to apply the strict rules of
evidence, whether the proceedings should be wholly or partly adversarial or
whether and to what extent they should make their own inquiries. They are the sole
judges of the evidence, including the assessment of the probabilities and resolving
issues of credibility.
63. In paras 41 to 44 of his judgment [2010] 1 All ER 302 the judge made
detailed findings which seem to me to be relevant to this question. I refer to only
some of them. In para 41 he described the history and development of the Ismaili
Community. He noted from the summary on the website of the Aga Khan Devel-
opment Network that in the early part of the 20th century Aga Khan III introduced
a range of « organisational forms that gave Ismaili communities the means to
structure and regulate their own affairs ». He added that those forms were estab-
lished against the background of « the Muslim tradition of a communitarian ethic
on the one hand, and responsible individual conscience with freedom to negotiate
one’s own moral commitment and destiny on the other ».
64. At para 42 the judge quoted extensively from the same summary which
included this: « Spiritual allegiance to the Imam and adherence to the Shia Imami
Ismaili tariqah (persuasion) of Islam according to the guidance of the Imam of the
time, have engendered in the Ismaili community an ethos of self-reliance, unity,
and a common identity ».
He noted that in 1986 the present Aga Khan: « promulgated a Constitution
that, for the first time, brought the social governance of the world-wide Ismaili
community into a single structure with built-in flexibility to account for diverse
circumstances of different regions. Served by volunteers appointed by and account-
able to the Imam, the Constitution functions as an enabler to harness the best in in-
dividual creativity in an ethos of group responsibility to promote the common
well-being. Like its predecessors, the present constitution is founded on each Is-
maili’s spiritual allegiance to the Imam of the time, which is separate from the
secular allegiance that all Ismailis owe as citizens to their national entities. The
guidance of the present Imam and his predecessor emphasised the Ismaili’s alle-
giance to his or her country as a fundamental obligation. These obligations dis-
charged not by passive affirmation but through responsible engagement and active
commitment to uphold national integrity and contribute to peaceful development ».
65. In para 43 the judge quoted from a paper presented to the Council of Eu-
rope in March 2009 by the Director of International Training with the secretariat of
the Aga Khan which included the following: « Under the Constitution, the Imam
has also established... National
639
and International Conciliation and Arbitration Boards to encourage amicable
resolution of conflicts through impartial conciliation, mediation and arbitration, a
service which is being increasingly used, in some countries, even by non-Ismailis.
In fulfilling the mandate to sustain social, economic, cultural and civil society de-
velopment, the Imamat collaborates with national governments, regional and inter-
national institutions as well as civil society organisations. This paper highlights the
work of the Conciliation and Arbitration Boards established under the Ismaili Con-
stitution and more particularly the training programmes that have been conducted
for them over the last decade, indicating some of the best practices.
Over the centuries, Ismaili communities in various parts of the world, have
been conducting their own ADR processes based on the ethics of the faith as guided
by the Imams of the Time. ... [The Aga Khan] was concerned about the massive
costs of litigation faced by members of the Ismaili community in various parts of
the world. Not only were the legal costs very high, but the legal procedures, in
many countries, were particularly lengthy and did not always result in outcomes
that conformed with the principles of natural justice. The Aga Khan was concerned
about compliance with the ethics of the faith which promote a non-adversarial ap-
proach to dispute resolution in keeping with the principles of negotiated settlement
(sulh) enshrined in the Holy Qur’an.
The study indicated that a majority of the cases were in the field of family
disputes and that the national courts in the countries, where the disputants were
settled, were not always able to comprehend the inter-generational attitudinal issues
involved, let alone being able to resolve them. This syndrome is very much in
keeping with the notion of the “limited remedial imagination” that Menkel-
Meadow attributes to the adversarial system which focuses on a zero-sum numbers
game where the “winner takes all”. It was therefore decided by the Imam, in con-
sultation with the leaders of the various Ismaili communities worldwide, to build
on the community’s existing tradition of settling disputes amicably within the eth-
ics of Islam and to establish Conciliation and Arbitration Boards at various levels
of social governance in the Ismaili communities throughout the world.
It was also felt that the system should be such that the first submission of an
issue to an arbitrational or mediational body should ensure the highest degree of
proficiency, probity and fairness so that the number of cases which go for appeal
would be minimal and that the process would be seen as being equitable, fair and
cost effective. The Aga Khan’s advice was that such a system should endeavour to
resolve disputes within the community without the disputants having to resort to
unnecessary litigation which is time consuming, expensive and destructive. The
Aga Khan saw the amicable resolution of disputes, without resorting to a court of
law and within the ethics of the faith, as an important aspect of the improvement
of the quality of life of the Ismailis globally. Consequently, the Ismaili Constitution
of 1986 made provision for the establishment of the Conciliation and Arbitration
Boards ».
66. The judge then in para 44 set out part of article XIII of the Constitution
which set up a National Conciliation and Arbitration Board for all types of dispute,
which provided by article 13.5: « Each National Conciliation and Arbitration Board
shall upon the application of any Ismaili assist him to settle any differences or dis-
putes with another party residing in the area of jurisdiction of the National Concili-
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ation and Arbitration Board in relation to any of the matters mentioned in article
13.1(a) ».
Article 13.1(a) provided that the Board was: « to assist in the conciliation
process between parties in differences or disputes arising from commercial, busi-
ness and other civil liability matters, domestic and family matters, including those
relating to matrimony, children of a marriage, matrimonial property, and testate and
intestate succession; ».
67. In these circumstances the judge held that the provision in the JVA which
provided that the arbitrators should be respected members of the Ismaili commu-
nity and holders of high office within the community was a GOR within regulation
7(3). He did so on the basis that the material set out above showed that, as he put
it at para 45, one of the more significant and characteristic spirits of the Ismaili sect
was an enthusiasm for dispute resolution contained within the Ismaili community.
He said that he had no difficulty in determining this spirit to be an « ethos based on
religion ». He also relied upon the terms of the arbitration clause itself and the en-
gagement by both sides of members of the Ismaili community to perform media-
tion and conciliation services from 1988 until 1994.
68. In my opinion the judge was justified in concluding that the requirement of
an Ismaili arbitrator can be regarded as a genuine occupational requirement on the ba-
sis that it was not only genuine but both legitimate and justified, so that requirement
(2) was satisfied. As to requirement (3), the judge said at para 46 that, had proportion-
ality been a live issue, having regard to the parties’ freedom in section 1 of the 1996
Act (quoted above) he would have held that article 8 of the JVA was proportionate.
69. The reasoning of the Court of Appeal [2010] ICR 1435 is set out in their
para 29 as follows: « The judge’s findings about the nature and ethos of the Ismaili
community were not challenged, but in our view he failed to pay sufficient regard
to the other requirements of regulation 7(3), in particular, to whether, having regard
to the ethos of that community and the nature of the arbitrator’s function, being an
Ismaili was a genuine occupational requirement for its proper discharge. If the ar-
bitration clause had empowered the tribunal to act ex aequo et bono it might have
been possible to show that only an Ismaili could be expected to apply the moral
principles and understanding of justice and fairness that are generally recognised
within that community as applicable between its members, but the
arbitrators’function under clause 8 of the joint venture agreement is to determine
the dispute between the parties in accordance with the principles of English law.
That requires some knowledge of the law itself, including the provisions of the Ar-
bitration Act 1996, and an ability to conduct the proceedings fairly in accordance
with the rules of natural justice, but it does not call for any particular ethos.
Membership of the Ismaili community is clearly not necessary for the dis-
charge of the arbitrator’s functions under an agreement of this kind and we are un-
able to accept, therefore, that the exception provided in regulation 7 of the 2003
Regulations can be invoked in this case ».
70. I prefer the approach of the judge. For the reasons given earlier, I am not
persuaded that the test is one of necessity. The question is whether, in all the cir-
cumstances the provision that all the arbitrators should be respected members of the
Ismaili community was legitimate and justified. In my opinion it was. The approach
of the Court of Appeal seems to me to be too legalistic and technical.
The parties could properly regard arbitration before three Ismailis as likely to
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involve a procedure in which the parties could have confidence and as likely to lead
to conclusions of fact in which they could have particular confidence.
71. For these reasons I would, if necessary, have allowed the appeal on the
basis that article 8 was a GOR within regulation 7(3). This conclusion makes it un-
necessary to consider whether it also satisfied regulation 7(2).
Severance and costs
72. In these circumstances, neither the severance issue raised by Mr Hashwani
nor the appeal on costs advanced by Mr Jivraj arises and I say nothing about them.
Reference to the Court of Justice
73. I would not refer any of the questions which arise in this appeal to the
Court of Justice. On the first question, the only questions of EC law which arise
relate to the true construction of the Directive. The Court of Justice has resolved
those issues in a number of cases, notably Allonby [2004] ICR 1328. To my mind
the principles are now acte clair. On the second question, the principal issue be-
tween the parties relates to the application of the relevant principles to the facts. As
to the correct construction of regulation 7(3), I have accepted Mr Brindle’s submis-
sion that it does not involve a wholly subjective question on the ground that the
relevant provision must be not only genuine, but also legitimate and justifiable. In
these circumstances, I see no basis for a reference in relation to GOR, which was
in any event not determinative of the appeal.
Conclusion
74. I would allow the appeal.
(Omissis).
Arbitrato, diritti umani e religioni.
1. Con la sentenza in epigrafe la Corte suprema inglese pone fine ad
un dibattito che, iniziato con la pronuncia del giudice di prime cure, ha
agitato gli esperti di arbitrato in Inghilterra ed in altre parti del mondo. La
rilevanza della piazza inglese per l’arbitrato e per il commercio internazio-
nale in generale ha infatti trasformato quella che, a prima vista, appariva
quale una vicenda de minimis, in una disputatio intorno al ruolo della reli-
gione nell’arbitrato commerciale internazionale nel secolo in cui vivia-
mo (1).
(1) V. in particolare: BERNINI, The parties right to choose a person as arbitrator and
642
A ben vedere, infatti, il caso Jivraj ha imposto una rivisitazione degli
stessi consolidati principi che stanno alla base dell’autonomia della volonta`
in sede di formazione ed esecuzione dell’accordo arbitrale con particolare
riferimento ai limiti della scelta degli arbitri ad opera delle parti. Cio`, sino
a lambire il terreno periglioso della natura del rapporto giuridico esistente
tra gli arbitri e le parti ad una controversia transnazionale.
2. Occorre premettere alcuni cenni di fatto. Il 29 gennaio 1981 due
appartenenti alla comunita` ismaelita, rispettivamente il Sig. Jivraj ed il Sig.
Haswani, avevano concluso un contratto di joint venture in cui, all’art. 8 si
stabiliva che, ogni controversia sarebbe stata risolta in via arbitrale da tre
arbitri, tutti « respected members » appartenenti alla stessa comunita`. Cia-
scuna parte avrebbe eletto un arbitro, tratto da detto gruppo sociale, men-
tre il terzo arbitro sarebbe stato nominato dall’Aga Khan in quanto Imam
della comunita` ismaelita. La joint venture aveva iniziato ad operare nel
commercio internazionale effettuando varie operazioni in Canada, negli
Stati Uniti, Pakistan e Regno Unito sviluppando un portafoglio finanziario
comprensivo di partecipazioni in terreni, hotel e societa` petrolifere. Nel
1988 i due soci avevano deciso di sciogliere la joint venture e, per fare cio`,
erano ricorsi ad un panel di conciliatori composto da membri della comu-
nita` ismaelita. Non riuscendo a comporre tutti gli interessi per questa via,
le parti ricorrevano ad arbitrato. Con lettera datata 31 luglio 2008, i legali
di Hashwani comunicavano alla controparte di avere nominato arbitro Sir
Anthony Colman, un giudice in pensione della Commercial Court con una
vasta esperienza in materia di arbitrato. In mancanza di una replica entro
breve termine, gli stessi legali indicavano che Sir Colman avrebbe ricoperto
la funzione di arbitro unico. Nella stessa lettera, aggiungevano che il rife-
rimento alla comunita` degli ismaeliti, previsto nella clausola compromisso-
ria di cui al predetto art. 8 dell’accordo di joint venture, doveva conside-
rarsi inefficace in quanto in contrasto, inter alia, con le disposizioni dello
Human Rights Act del 1998: pertanto la nomina di un non ismaelita, Sir
the prohibition of discrimination: an unstable balance (the Jivraj v. Hashwani case), in
World Journal of Arbitration, 11/2011, 35-56; WILLIAMS, MORRIS, Hashwani v Jivraj - A Bar-
rier To The Appointment Of An Arbitrator Based On Religious Belief?, in Mealey’s Interna-
tional Arbitration Report, August 2010, 29 ss. ; YANG, Nurdin Jivraj v. Sadruddin Hashwani:
The English Court of Appeal Erects a Regulatory Barrier to Appointment of Arbitrators in
the Name of Anti-Discrimination, in J. Int. Arb., 2011, 243 ; ZAIWALLA, Are Arbitrators Not
Human? Are They from Mars? Why Should Arbitrators be a Separate Species?, in J. Int.
Arb., 2011, 273; CLIFFORD, HAERI, Jivraj v. Hashwani: Arbitrator Nationality and the Law of
Unintended Consequences, in Berkeley Journal Intern’l Law Publicist, vol. 8, Spring 2011;
LAZAREFF, Des Ismae´liens..., in Cah. arb., 2010.959; RIGAUDEAU, La communaute´ arbitrale
victime de discriminations a` l’embauche re´pe´te´es?, in LPA, 21 febbraio 2011, 14 ss.. V. pure,
KLEIMAN, Arbitre, intuitu personae, in Liber amicorum S. Lazareff, Paris, Pedone, 2011, 361
ss., nonche´ Rev. arb., 2011, con nota di SERAGLINI.
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Colman, era perfettamente lecita. Nel rigettare tale richiesta, Jivraj adiva la
Commercial Court di Londra chiedendo che venisse pronunciata la nullita`
della nomina ad arbitro di Sir Colman in quanto in contrasto con la speci-
fica modalita` di nomina pattuita nella clausola compromissoria.
3. Il giudice di prime cure, la Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial
Court) della High Court of Justice (2) rilevava che non sussisteva un con-
trasto con le Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations del
2003, tramite le quali era stata trasposta la Direttiva n. 2000/78/CE del
Consiglio, del 27 novembre 2000, che stabilisce un quadro generale per la
parita` di trattamento in materia di occupazione e di condizioni di lavoro, ne´
si ravvisavano profili di illiceita` rispetto allo Human Rights Act 1998. In
particolare, si osservava che gli arbitri non sono da considerarsi “em-
ployed” ai sensi e per gli effetti delle predette Regulations. Inoltre, si ag-
giungeva che, anche se per ipotesi si giungesse a quella conclusione, le
specifiche circostanze del caso, ossia il requisito dell’appartenenza degli
arbitri alla comunita` ismaelita, rendeva comunque applicabile l’eccezione
del « genuine occupational requirement » — eccezione prevista allor-
quando l’appartenenza ad una data comunita` o gruppo sociale costituisca
un elemento connaturato con il particolare lavoro da svolgere — giacche´ si
ravvisava in detta comunita` un « ethos based on religion », oltre, beninteso,
all’« entusiasmo » per la soluzione delle controversie in via arbitrale. Os-
servava altresı` che, nel caso di specie, qualora fosse stata accolta la tesi
della discriminazione per motivi di religione, la conseguenza non sarebbe
stata la mera inefficacia della clausola arbitrale nella sola parte relativa alla
modalita` di scelta degli arbitri, bensı` l’invalidita` dell’intero patto compro-
missorio.
In conclusione, il giudice di primo grado rigettava in toto le istanze di
Haswani e, pertanto, quest’ultimo ricorreva alla Corte d’Appello chiedendo
una pronuncia ove quest’ultima decidesse se gli arbitri ricadono nel campo
di applicazione delle predette Regulations; se fosse o meno applicabile al
caso di specie la predetta eccezione relativa al « genuine occupational re-
quirement » di cui all’art. 7 (3) delle Regulations ed infine, se la violazione
di dette Regulations comportasse l’invalidita` dell’intero accordo arbitrale
ovvero solo della parte dell’accordo in cui si realizzava una discrimina-
zione per motivi di religione.
4. La Corte d’appello di Londra, con una sentenza che ha fatto scal-
pore (3), accoglieva il ricorso e rigettava la tesi del giudice di prime cure
rilevando che gli arbitri sono dei lavoratori « employed » ai sensi e per gli
(2) [2010] All ER 302.
(3) [2010] EWCA Civ. 712; All ER 302.
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effetti delle suindicate Regulations. Il rapporto di arbitrato, osservano i giu-
dici d’appello, e` un contratto ove un soggetto, l’arbitro, si obbliga a pre-
stare personalmente la propria opera: pertanto, tale fattispecie e` coperta
dalla definizione di « employment » di cui alle predette Regulations. Percio`,
limitare la scelta delle parti — che divengono cosı` dei « datori di lavoro »
degli arbitri — ai solo membri della comunita` ismaelita, equivale a violare
il divieto di discriminazione nei rapporti di lavoro per motivi di religione.
Quanto alla applicabilita` della eccezione relativa al « genuine occupa-
tional requirement », ossia della stretta correlazione tra l’attivita` da svol-
gere e l’appartenenza ad una data comunita` di cui all’art. 7(3) delle Regu-
lations, la Corte d’Appello non ravvisava, nel caso di specie, gli estremi per
applicare detta eccezione, con il risultato di rendere l’accordo arbitrale di-
scriminatorio e, pertanto, invalido.
5. La Supreme Court inglese, composta da Lord Phillips (Presi-
dente) assieme a Lords Clarke, Dyson, Mance and Walker, investita dell’ul-
teriore ricorso, ha dovuto definitivamente pronunciarsi sull’intera questione
ed e` di quest’ultima pronuncia che sono stati riportati ampi estratti in que-
sta Rivista.
Cassando la sentenza della Corte d’Appello, la Suprema Corte ha de-
finitivamente pronunciato che, pur se la nomina ad arbitro puo` rientrare
nelle fattispecie coperte dalle predette Regulations in quanto comprendenti
ogni « employment under... a contract personally to do any work », non si
configura nel caso di specie alcun rapporto di subordinazione. Infatti, attra-
verso un’ampia disamina della giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia UE,
la stessa Corte differenzia la posizione di coloro i quali sono da conside-
rarsi « employed » da quei soggetti che invece sono « independent provi-
ders of services » come avviene, appunto, per l’arbitrato.
Cosı`, il requisito dell’appartenenza alla comunita` ismaelita degli arbi-
tri non preclude, in se´ e per se´, agli arbitri di accedere al lavoro autonomo
o subordinato ed in ogni caso, secondo la Corte, il carattere peculiare del
contratto di arbitrato (prescindendo anche dagli aspetti fiscali quali l’even-
tuale applicazione delle norme sull’IVA) non consente di applicare al caso
di specie le Regulations inglesi.
Quanto alla questione dell’eventuale invalidita` dell’accordo arbitrale
la Suprema Corte ha stabilito, per le stesse ragioni di cui sopra, che tale ac-
cordo e` valido ed efficace. Pertanto, in un arbitrato tra membri della comu-
nita` ismaelita il riferimento ad arbitri ismaeliti e` legittimo e le parti sono
libere di riporre la propria fiducia (« confidence ») su un procedimento di
questo tipo.
6. Insomma: back to basics! Sin dalle proprie origini, l’arbitrato si e`
caratterizzato per alcuni tratti che ancor oggi ne determinano l’essenza.
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Uno di questi concerne proprio la possibilita` per le parti di scegliere i pro-
pri giudici privati (4) ed e` proprio questo il primo problema che la sentenza
in commento deve risolvere.
Notava gia` Carabibier, in un corso all’Accademia di diritto internazio-
nale dell’Aja nel 1960 che, nonostante una lunga tradizione, il codice di
procedura civile francese del 1806 aveva tentato di codificare i principali
tratti dell’arbitrato seguendo tuttavia un approccio legislativo restrittivo ed
incentrato solo sulla dimensione processuale della giustizia arbitrale giac-
che´ « le le´gislateur du Premier empire se mefiait des juges occasionnels
que sont les arbitres » (5). Opposto approccio si era seguito in Inghilterra,
ove invece l’arbitrato aveva mantenuto il proprio ruolo nell’ambito della
piu` vasta lex mercatoria, un ruolo centrale volto alla soluzione delle con-
troversie mercantili, dato che era destinato ad essere impiegato principal-
mente nei porti e nelle fiere per la materia mercantile e marittima (6).
E` pacifico quindi che, ancor oggi, uno dei motivi specifici che indu-
cono le parti a ricorrere al giudizio arbitrale invece che impostare un con-
tenzioso transnazionale dinanzi ad un giudice nazionale e` proprio la possi-
bilita` di scegliere direttamente almeno un arbitro nonche´, sia pure indiret-
tamente, partecipare alla nomina del presidente del collegio arbitrale. Cio`
in quanto, secondo alcuni Autori,« [t]he parties can appoint persons in
whom they have confidence, and who have the necessary legal and techni-
cal expertise for the determination of the particular dispute » (7). O ancora,
(4) Sul tema, tra una vastissima letteratura, si vedano in particolare: BENEDETTELLI,
CONSOLO, RADICATI DI BROZOLO, Commentario breve al diritto dell’arbitrato nazionale ed in-
ternazionale, Padova, 2010, sub art. 810 c.p.c.; GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques du droit de
l’arbitrage international, in RCADI, v. 329, 2009, 49 ss.; BLACKABY, PARTASIDES, Redfern and
Hunter on International Arbitration, Oxford, 5th ed., 2009, 258 s.; BORN, International Com-
mercial Arbitration, Kluwer, I, 2009, 1363 ss.; BERNARDINI, L’arbitrato nel commercio e ne-
gli investimenti internazionali, II ed., Milano, 2008; POUDRET, BESSON, Droit compare´ de l’ar-
bitrage international, Zurich, 2007, 352 ss.; TH. CLAY, L’arbitre, Paris, 2001, n. 862, 657;
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, Traite´ de l’arbitrage commercial international, Paris, 1999,
nn. 785 ss.; ROBINE, Le choix des arbitres, in Rev. arb., 1990, 315 ss.; LALIVE, Le choix de
l’arbitre, in Me´langes Jacques Robert, Paris, 1998, 353 ss.; BRIGUGLIO, FAZZALARI, MARENGO,
La nuova disciplina dell’arbitrato. Commentario, Milano, 1994, 33 ss.; GIARDINA, L’arbitrato
internazionale, in questa Rivista, 1992, 21 ss.; LALIVE, POUDRET, REYMOND, Le droit de l’arbi-
trage interne et internationale en Suisse, Lausanne, 1989, 74 ss.; R. DAVID, Arbitration in In-
ternational Trade, Kluwer, 1985, 2 ss. ove ampi riferimenti. V. pure con un taglio di tipo so-
ciologico lo studio di DEZALAY, GARTH, Dealing in virtue, University of Chicago Press, 1996.
(5) CARABIBIER, L’evolution de la`rbitrage commercial international, in RCADI, 1960,
v. 99, 1, 127.
(6) Su tali aspetti si consenta di rinviare a MARRELLA, Alle origini dell’arbitrato
commerciale internazionale. L’arbitrato a Venezia tra Medio Evo ed Eta` moderna, con pref.
di GIARDINA, Padova, 2001, passim, nonche´ ID., La nuova lex mercatoria. Principi Unidroit
ed usi del commercio internazionale, Padova, 2002.
(7) LEW, MISTELIS, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer,
2003, 223 ss., nonche´ SANDERS, Quo Vadis Arbitration?, Kluwer, 1999, 229 ss.
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secondo un celebre adagio, « arbitration is only as good as its arbitra-
tors » (8).
Fermi restando i requisiti di capacita`, imparzialita` ed indipendenza
degli arbitri, ogni altro requisito quindi non puo` essere utilmente fissato che
dalle parti stesse attraverso l’esercizio della propria autonomia contrattuale.
Detta autonomia contrattuale e` soggetta ad un limite generalissimo di ra-
gionevolezza (9) e, se l’arbitrato e` commerciale-internazionale, ai limiti
delle norme di applicazione necessaria e dell’ordine pubblico internaziona-
le (10).
In questa vastissima sfera di ragionevole autonomia, dunque, le parti
possono concordare, in sede di redazione dell’accordo arbitrale che gli ar-
bitri debbano essere iscritti ad un determinato ordine professionale (anche
diverso da quello degli avvocati, si pensi ai dottori commercialisti, agli in-
gegneri, architetti ecc.), che posseggano particolare esperienza in specifiche
materie, come quella del diritto internazionale o di specifici contratti (ad es.
appalti privati e condizioni FIDIC), che conoscano una o piu` lingue (ad es.
quelle di entrambe le parti) e cosi via.
A fortiori, se le parti si riferiscono all’arbitrato amministrato da
un’istituzione che stila periodicamente liste di arbitri da essa stessa consi-
derati come « qualificati », non v’e` dubbio che il riferimento a tale regola-
mento arbitrale nell’accordo arbitrale valga per le parti quale accettazione
di detta modalita` di nomina. Milita in tal senso una lunga tradizione in Ita-
lia (11) ed all’estero, tradizione che ancor oggi e particolarmente evidente
negli arbitrati di qualita` come quello GAFTA a Londra — e piu` in generale
laddove le parti si riferiscano al « commercial man » (12) — o ancora nel-
l’arbitrato marittimo (13). La mancata ottemperanza ai parametri dettati
dalla istituzione arbitrale in materia di scelta dell’arbitro a volte e` persino
(8) LALIVE, Some practical suggestions on international arbitration, in Melanges en
l’honneur de Nicholas Valticos: Droit et Justice, Paris, 1989, 287 ss. V., nello stesso senso,
Pierre LALIVE, Proble`mes relatifs a` l’arbitrage international commercial, in RCADI, 1967-1,
v. 120, 578 ss.
(9) BERNINI, op. cit., ove ampi riferimenti.
(10) In argomento v. GALGANO, MARRELLA, Diritto del commercio internazionale, III
ed., Padova, 2011.
(11) V. l’intramontabile saggio di NOBILI, L’arbitrato delle associazioni commerciali,
Padova, 1957, 19 ss. Ancor oggi, diversi regolamenti arbitrali stilati da Camere di commer-
cio prevedono che la scelta dell’arbitro debba ricadere esclusivamente sui nominativi degli
iscritti sulle liste stilate ed aggiornate da dette camere.
(12) LEW, MISTELIS, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer,
2003, 223 ss., nonche´ SANDERS, Quo Vadis Arbitration?, Kluwer, 1999, 229 ss.
(13) V. il sito http://www.gafta.com/arbitration ove si legge che « All disputes are
adjudicated by Arbitrators who have been assessed under the CPDP requirement and are
qualified arbitrators » ed in argomento si v. Bernstein’s handbook of arbitration practice,
London, 2003, cap. 16. Sull’arbitrato marittimo si v. MARRELLA, Unita` e diversita` dell’arbi-
trato internazionale: l’arbitrato marittimo, in Dir. mar., 2005, 787 ss. ove riferimenti.
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munita di sanzione, tanto da poter aprire le porte ad un’istanza di ricusa-
zione a causa della violazione del regolamento di arbitrato.
8. Tutto quanto ora ricordato ha trovato un significativo riconosci-
mento, con varie sfumature, in alcuni strumenti normativi nazionali, nei
principali regolamenti arbitrali e nei principali atti internazionali in materia
di arbitrato commerciale internazionale.
Basti ricordare, a tale riguardo, l’art. 179 della LDIP svizzera che, in
modo cristallino, prevede che « [g]li arbitri sono nominati, revocati e sosti-
tuiti giusta quanto pattuito fra le parti » e solo in assenza di tali pattuizioni
si ricorre ai criteri di scelta previsti dal diritto svizzero. Ancora: negli Stati
Uniti, la Section 5 del Federal Arbitration Act del 1925 — ma ancora in vi-
gore — prevede che « [I]f in the agreement provision be made for a
method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire,
such method shall be followed » (14). Nella stessa ottica, riteniamo, e` da
interpretare l’art. 809, comma 2, c.p.c. italiano ai sensi del quale « [l]a
convenzione d’arbitrato deve contenere la nomina degli arbitri oppure sta-
bilire il numero di essi e il modo di nominarli ».
Meno chiara, invece, la formula impiegata all’art. 11 della Legge Mo-
dello dell’UNCITRAL del 1985 giacche´ si prevede solo che le parti siano
libere di accordarsi sul « procedimento di scelta » degli arbitri (« the par-
ties are free to agree on a procedure of appointing the arbitrator or arbi-
trators »).
Senonche´, la legge modello dell’UNCITRAL prevede, all’art. 18, un
limite alla scelta delle parti prevedendo che « the parties shall be treated
with equality » (15).
Detta formula, cosı` ci sembra, diviene intelligibile nell’ottica di po-
tenziali squilibri contrattuali, ribadendo il principio della parita` dei poteri
delle parti, secondo il quale nessuna delle parti deve avere piu` potere del-
l’altra (o delle altre) nella scelta degli arbitri. In quest’ottica diviene di par-
ticolare interesse anche la legge tedesca del 22 dicembre 1997 la quale,
onde evitare clausole di scelta arbitrale « squilibrate »se non vessatorie,
prevede, all’art. 1034, par. 2, ZPO, che: « Gibt die Schiedsvereinbarung ei-
(14) U.S. FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 5.
(15) Secondo la UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/clout/MAL-digest-
2012-e.pdf, « Article 11 addresses the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, a question of a si-
gnificant practical importance. First and foremost, it grants parties extensive freedom with
respect to who may be appointed as an arbitrator as well as to how arbitrators are to be ap-
pointed. Secondly, article 11 sets out several rules which are applicable unless otherwise
agreed to by the parties: one prohibits discrimination based on nationality, while the others
establish default appointment procedures that provide guidance when the parties have remai-
ned silent on the method of appointment of the arbitrator — or the arbitrators, in the case of
a three-member arbitral tribunal ».
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ner Partei bei der Zusammensetzung des Schiedsgerichts ein U¨bergewicht,
das die andere Partei benachteiligt, so kann diese Partei bei Gericht bean-
tragen, den oder die Schiedsrichter abweichend von der erfolgten Ernen-
nung oder der vereinbarten Ernennungsregelung zu bestellen. Der Antrag
ist spa¨testens bis zum Ablauf von zwei Wochen, nachdem der Partei die
Zusammensetzung des Schiedsgerichts bekannt geworden ist, zu stellen. §
1032 Abs. 3 gilt entsprechend » (16).
9. I principali regolamenti arbitrali (relativi all’arbitrato commer-
ciale internazionale generale) fanno spesso riferimento alla nazionalita` del-
l’arbitro (normalmente il presidente del collegio arbitrale) con il fine di
massimizzare la « neutralita` culturale » del collegio arbitrale (17). In tal
senso, e ancora una volta, certamente non in chiave discriminatoria, vanno
dunque intese le norme di cui all’art. 5.4 e 6 LCIA del 1998 e, soprattutto
dell’art. 9, comma 1, del regolamento ICC 1998 divenuto l’art. 13, comma
1, del reg. ICC in vigore dal 1o gennaio 2012, ai sensi del quale « [n]el
confermare o nominare gli arbitri, la Corte tiene conto della loro naziona-
lita` e residenza e degli altri rapporti con gli Stati di cui le parti o gli altri
arbitri hanno la nazionalita`, nonche´ della disponibilita` e della capacita` de-
gli arbitri di condurre un arbitrato conformemente al Regolamento ».
10. Particolari limiti alla scelta degli arbitri ad opera delle parti po-
trebbero anche derivare dall’applicazione delle convenzioni internazionali
in materia di arbitrato. Non essendo possibile effettuare un’analisi completa
in questa sede, va comunque osservato che il Protocollo di Ginevra del 24
settembre 1923 prevedeva, sia pure in modo alquanto ambiguo, che « [l]a
proce´dure de l’arbitrage, y compris la constitution du tribunal arbitral, est
re´gle´e par la volonte´ des parties et par la loi du pays sur le territoire
duquel l’arbitrage a lieu ». Una formula ripresa successivamente all’art.
1(2)(d))della Convenzione di Ginevra del 26 settembre 1927 (18) e che
diede vita ad un’interpretazione largamente seguita secondo la quale la vo-
lonta` delle parti va considerata centrale ed efficace in pieno salva una sua
limitazione in presenza di una violazione delle norme imperative dello
Stato in cui l’arbitrato ha sede.
La Convenzione di New York del 10 giugno 1958 sul riconoscimento
e l’esecuzione dei lodi arbitrali stranieri ha ulteriormente confermato detto
(16) V. SCHLOSSER, La nouvelle le´gislation allemande sur l’arbitrage, in Rev. arb.,
1998, 291 ss.; LO¨RCHER, The New German Arbitration Act, in J. Int’l Arb., 1998, 85 ss.; BER-
GER, Germany adopts the UNCITRAL Model Law, in Int’l Arb. L. Rev., 1998, 121 s.
(17) In argomento v. per tutti BERNINI, Cultural Neutrality: A Prerequisite to Arbitral
Justice, in Mich. J. Int’l L., 1989, 39 ss.
(18) Su cui v. per tutti BALLADORE PALLIERI, L’arbitrage prive dans les rapports inter-
nationaux, in RCADI, 1935, I, 291 ss.
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approccio (19). Infatti, l’art. V, par. 1, lett. (d), di detta convenzione prevede
che il giudice statale possa rifiutarsi di concedere l’exequatur qualora:
« [t]he composition of the arbitral authority... was not in accordance with
the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accor-
dance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place ».
Si conferma, ancora una volta, la filosofia sottesa alle norme in tema
di scelta degli arbitri ad opera delle parti: un’ampia autonomia, fatto salvo
il limite delle norme imperative, ma anche un’autonomia che se non eser-
citata puo` essere integrata dalle norme della lex arbitri che in questo caso
svolgera` una funzione suppletiva quanto ai meccanismi di nomina degli ar-
bitri (e di fissazione del numero degli stessi).
Un cenno va fatto poi alla Convenzione europea sull’arbitrato com-
merciale internazionale del 21 aprile 1961 (20) ove, all’art. IV, la sfera di
autonomia delle parti viene precisata e salvaguardata indicando che « The
parties to an arbitration agreement shall be free to submit their disputes:
(a) to a permanent arbitral institution; in this case, the arbitration procee-
dings shall be held in conformity with the rules of the said institution; (b)
to an ad hoc arbitral procedure; in this case, they shall be free inter alia (i)
to appoint arbitrators or to establish means for their appointment in the
event of an actual dispute [...] ». Qui manca persino il riferimento alla lex
situs arbitri onde valorizzare al massimo la scelta delle parti a differenza
delle corrispondenti norme del Protocollo e della Convenzione di Ginevra.
Dall’altra parte dell’Atlantico, la Convenzione inter-americana sull’ar-
bitrato commerciale internazionale del 30 gennaio 1975 prevede una solu-
zione in linea con quanto sopra osservato all’art. 2 laddove si stabilisce che
« Arbitrators shall be appointed in the manner agreed upon by the parties.
Their appointment may be delegated to a third party, whether a natural or
juridical person. Arbitrators may be nationals or foreigners ».
La scelta degli arbitri ad opera delle parti viene, invece, per cosı` dire,
« indirizzata » nell’ambito della ben nota Convenzione di Washington del
18 marzo 1965 in materia di arbitrato tra Stati e privati stranieri. Qui, l’IC-
SID dispone di una lista di arbitri i cui nominativi vengono forniti dagli
Stati contraenti della Convenzione di Washington ovvero dal Presidente del
Consiglio di Amministrazione dello stesso ICSID (art. 40). Ma anche qui,
onde valorizzare la volonta` delle parti si stabilisce che il riferimento a detta
lista ha carattere facoltativo e non obbligatorio fermo restando il possesso
(19) In argomento si vedano ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New
York Convention: A Handbook for Judges, 2011, 36-65; BRIGUGLIO, L’arbitrato estero, Pa-
dova, 1999 e cfr. VAN DEN BERG, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958, The Hague,
Asser, 1981, 325 ss.
(20) Su cui v. inter alios, LUZZATTO, Accordi Internazionali e diritto interno in mate-
ria di arbitrato: la convenzione di Ginevra del 21 aprile 1961, in Riv. dir. int. priv. proc.,
1971, 47.
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di alcune qualifiche cosı` indicate all’art. 14, par. 1, « Persons designated to
serve on the Panels shall be persons of high moral character and recogni-
zed competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who
may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment. Competence in the
field of law shall be of particular importance in the case of persons on the
Panel of Arbitrators ». Cio` in quanto, ancora una volta, e` indispensabile
consentire alle parti di scegliere come arbitri delle persone che godano
della loro fiducia e, ai loro occhi, posseggano una specifica expertise nella
materia del contendere (21).
11. Effettuate le premesse di cui sopra, il caso deciso dalla Corte
Suprema Britannica appare dunque relativamente semplice e non sorprende
l’esito raggiunto. Piuttosto, le difficolta` del caso di specie emergono com-
binando i principi di cui sopra con delle qualifiche particolari richieste agli
arbitri non tanto in nome di pure necessita` mercantili, bensı` in quanto le-
gate a motivazioni di carattere prevalentemente religioso.
Trattasi di fenomeni raramente assurti al rango della cronaca giudizia-
ria in quanto, come osservava Rene´ David, al pari di quanto si indica par-
lando della societas mercatorum, si tratta di sodalizi assai chiusi ove una
giustizia diversa da quella arbitrale — in particolare quella statuale — e`
percepita quale « altra » giustizia, e pertanto considerata con disfavore dalla
comunita` di appartenenza (22).
Cosı`, l’arbitrato e` stato da sempre largamente praticato nella tradi-
zione ebraica (23) per la soluzione di controversie di ogni tipo specialmente
nei Paesi ove vivono vaste comunita`, quali gli Stati Uniti, la Gran Bretagna
o la Francia.
Del pari, anche la tradizione musulmana, come testimonia il caso di
specie riferito alla comunita` ismaelita (24), conosce da sempre l’arbitrato —
viene infatti previsto nello stesso Corano al versetto 4:35 — intessendo
rapporti peculiari con il diritto secolare dei singoli Stati islamici i quali
hanno adottato apposite legislazioni caratterizzate da una maggiore o mi-
nore apertura verso l’arbitrato del commercio internazionale. Alcuni recenti
studi hanno messo bene in evidenza che le leggi in materia arbitrale dei
Paesi musulmani si sono largamente ispirate alla Legge Modello dell’UN-
(21) V. Per tutti: SCHREUER, MALINTOPPI, REINISCH, SINCLAIR, The ICSID Convention. A
Commentary, II ed., Cambridge, 2009, 509 ss.
(22) DAVID, L’arbitrage dans le commerce international, Paris, 1982. V. pure MAR-
RELLA, La nuova lex mercatoria, cit., nonche´ i diversi contributi editi nel num. spec. di Soc.
dir., f. 2-3, 2005, con particolare riferimento al saggio di BOSCHIERO.
(23) LEBEN, L’arbitrage par un tribunal rabbinique appliquant le droit he´braı¨que, in
Rev. arb., 2011, 87 ss.
(24) Su cui v. ad es. VERCELLIN, Istituzioni del mondo musulmano, Torino, 1996; DA-
TARI, Gli ismaeliti: storia di una comunita` musulmana, Venezia, 2011.
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CITRAL del 1985 e a quelle in vigore nei Paesi occidentali. Sicche´ in sede
di analisi comparatistica, all’interno della famiglia del diritto islamico,
sembra possibile cogliere un approccio variabile nei confronti dell’arbitrato
secondo una scala in cui si possono collocare pochissimi Paesi che appli-
cano un vincolo massimo (equiparazione dell’arbitro, quale hakam, al giu-
dice nazionale con imposizione quindi dei caratteri del genere maschile e
del credo islamico) alla maggioranza degli altri Stati che invece lasciano
dette qualifiche alla libera determinazione delle parti (ad es. Libano ed
Egitto) (25).
Insomma, al di fuori del diverso problema concernente la discrimina-
zione ex lege attraverso la normativa sull’arbitrato di fonte statale che nel
nostro secolo sembra essere ormai superato, il problema della selezione de-
gli arbitri puo` essere pacatamente impostato facendo riferimento alla vo-
lonta` delle parti. Cosı`, posto che l’autonomia della volonta` delle parti ha un
valore centrale nell’arbitrato commerciale internazionale, ne segue che e` ad
essa che occorre fare riferimento anche nel valutare, con ragionevolezza,
delicate questioni che concernono l’appartenenza religiosa delle parti e de-
gli arbitri. Cosı` ha fatto la Corte Suprema inglese con una sentenza che, per
il suo equilibrio, e` da accogliere con favore.
In tal senso, sembra concludere anche il prof. Pietro Rescigno, in un
articolo concernente l’appartenenza di un arbitro all’Opus Dei appena pub-
blicato in questa rivista (n. 2/2012) e che ben evidenzia il possibile impatto
della sentenza britannica negli altri Paesi, compresa l’Italia, in cui quelle
problematiche potrebbero porsi.
12. Altro punto di sicuro interesse della sentenza in epigrafe tocca il
tema generale del rapporto giuridico esistente tra gli arbitri e le parti, sia
pure nell’ambito di un arbitrato amministrato.
E` ben noto che anche questo tema ha agitato la dottrina specialistica
in Italia ed all’estero sicche´ un esame dei vari contributi in subiecta mate-
ria esula certamente dai limiti del presente scritto. Basti comunque osser-
vare che il punto di arrivo di tale dibattito e` quello di dare una qualifica-
zione contrattuale al rapporto tra le parti e l’arbitro, fermo restando l’og-
getto processuale di detto contratto (26).
(25) V. per tutti: PAPA, L’arbitrato commerciale nei Paesi arabi, Perugia, 1992;
BROWER, SHARPE, International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The Third Phase, in Am. J.
Intl. L., 2003, 643 ss. e soprattutto il monumentale studio di EL AHDAB, Arbitration with the
Arab Countries, III ed., Kluwer, 2011. V. pure KHAWAR QURESHI, Cultural sensitivity and in-
ternational arbitration, in International Journal of Arab Arbitration, v. 2, 2009, 41 ss.; AH-
MAD ALKHAMEES, International Arbitration and Shari’a Law: Context, Scope, and Intersec-
tions, ivi, 2011, v. 3, 255-264. Piu` in generale v. R. DAVID, C. JAUFFRET SPINOSI, I grandi si-
stemi giuridici contemporanei, 5a ed., Padova, 2004, 378 ss.
(26) Per l’Italia si vedano, inter multos: BALLADORE PALLIERI, L’arbitrage, cit., 334
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Secondo l’opinione pressoche´ generale, si tratta di un « contratto di
arbitrato », contratto atipico che si instaura tra ciascun arbitro e le parti.
Meno pacifica e`, tuttavia, la determinazione di tutti i suoi effetti: taluni lo
assimilano ad un mandato, altri ad un contratto d’opera professionale rien-
trante percio`, nella categoria generale del lavoro autonomo. L’art. 813-ter
c.p.c. ha disciplinato in modo alquanto analitico specifiche fattispecie di re-
sponsabilita` dell’arbitro, compresa quella per omessa pronuncia del lodo
che pero` non hanno consentito di risolvere in maniera definitiva la vexata
questio dell’atipicita` del contratto di arbitrato.
Orbene, anche sotto quest’ultimo profilo, il thema decidendi dinanzi
alla Corte Suprema inglese e` di grande interesse. La Corte, infatti, doveva
decidere se, sulla base di un contratto di arbitrato, fossero ravvisabili gli
estremi di un contratto di lavoro subordinato, almeno ai fini delle norme
inglesi di trasposizione della Direttiva n. 2000/78/CE del Consiglio, del 27
novembre 2000 che stabilisce un quadro generale per la parita` di tratta-
mento in materia di occupazione e di condizioni di lavoro e del divieto ge-
nerale di discriminazione in base alla religione nei rapporti di lavoro (27).
La risposta a tale quesito, stante la natura del diritto dell’Unione Europea,
ha rilevanza anche per l’Italia, dato che si tratta, inter alia, dell’interpreta-
zione ad opera di un giudice nazionale delle norme di trasposizione di una
direttiva comunitaria, direttiva che, qualora fosse di dubbia interpretazione,
potrebbe costituire oggetto di rinvio pregiudiziale alla Corte di Giustizia
dell’Unione Europea con evidente ricaduta di quest’ultima pronuncia sullo
statuto dell’arbitro in tutti e ventisette gli Stati Membri.
In tale contesto, la Corte d’appello inglese aveva indicato che la cir-
costanza secondo la quale la nomina di un arbitro e` finalizzata ad ottenere
dei servizi specifici rendeva di per se´ applicabili tutte le disposizioni in
ss.; REDENTI, voce Compromesso, in Nss. D.I., Torino, 1957, 789 ss.; BIAMONTI, voce Arbitrato
(diritto processuale civile), in Enc. dir., I, Milano, 1958, 916 ss.; MIRABELLI, Contratti nel-
l’arbitrato (con l’arbitro, con l’istituzione arbitrale), in Rass. arb., 1990, 22 ss.; CARPI (a
cura di), L’arbitrato, Bologna, 2001, 172 ss. ove ampi riferimenti. Tra la dottrina straniera
cfr.: LALIVE, POUDRET, REYMOND, Le droit de l’arbitrage interne et international en Suisse, cit.,
sub art. 179; FOUCHARD, in ICC, The Status of the arbitrator, in ICC Int.Cr. Bull, spec. Suppl.,
1995; SCHLOSSER, in STEIN, JONAS (eds.), Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung § 1025, 22a ed.,
2002; SCHO¨LDSTRO¨M, The Arbitrator’s Mandate - A Comparative Study of Relationships in
Commercial Arbitration under the Laws of England, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, 94-
97, 200-201, 1998; GAILLARD & SAVAGE (eds.), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International
Commercial Arbitration, cit., 1119-21; BORN, International commercial arbitration, I, Klu-
wer, 2009, 1607 ss.
(27) Ai sensi dell’art. 3, par. 1, lett. a della Dir. n. 2000/78/CE: « la presente diret-
tiva, si applica a tutte le persone, sia del settore pubblico che del settore privato, compresi
gli organismi di diritto pubblico, per quanto attiene: a) alle condizioni di accesso all’occupa-
zione e al lavoro, sia dipendente che autonomo, compresi i criteri di selezione e le condizioni
di assunzione indipendentemente dal ramo di attivita` e a tutti i livelli della gerarchia profes-
sionale, nonche´ alla promozione) ».
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materia di libera prestazioni di servizi nonche´ quelle proibitive di qualun-
que discriminazione. Cio` in quanto, secondo il giudice d’appello, le Em-
ployment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations del 2003, con cui la di-
rettiva de qua aveva ricevuto trasposizione in Inghilterra, si applicano a
tutti i rapporti di lavoro fatta eccezione per quelle attivita` ove un partico-
lare credo religioso costituisce un « genuine occupational requirement ». Di
piu`, il divieto generale di discriminazione per motivi religiosi e` previsto
dall’art. 14 della Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti del-
l’uomo e delle liberta` fondamentali del 4 novembre 1950 oltre che, per il
tramite del rinvio di cui all’art. 6 TEU, all’art. 21 della Carta dei diritti
fondamentali dell’Unione Europea. Senonche´, e` ben noto che tali divieti
opererebbero onde evitare che gli ordinamenti nazionali tramite, ad esem-
pio, la propria legislazione sull’arbitrato introducessero — come un tempo
era avvenuto anche in Italia — discriminazioni in base alla nazionalita`,
sesso, religione ecc. restringendo per questa via la sfera di autonomia delle
parti: si tratta quindi del caso opposto a quello di specie (28).
La posizione, a dire il vero, troppo vaga della Corte d’Appello, si ri-
collegava a quella espressa, in modo alquanto generico e comunque obiter,
sul piano dell’ordinamento comunitario, dall’Avvocato generale Maduro
nel caso Centrum (29). Qui, l’Avvocato generale aveva osservato che la Di-
rettiva de qua va interpretata in un contesto ampio, teso a permettere l’ac-
cesso al mercato del lavoro a tutti, eliminando qualsivoglia ostacolo alla
fornitura di servizi, con particolare riferimento alle discriminazioni di
razza, sesso e religione. Ma che l’arbitrato sia un lavoro di cui qualcuno
possa farne la propria professione principale o esclusiva, come quella di un
avvocato, di un architetto o di un... idraulico, e` un miraggio che colpisce
solo chi dell’arbitrato non ha mai avuto alcuna esperienza concreta!
Orbene, secondo la Corte d’Appello gli arbitri rientravano nella no-
zione generale di « employees » di cui alle predette Regulations in quanto
alla base del loro rapporto con le parti si colloca « a contract personally to
do any work ». Pertanto, sempre secondo la Corte, l’accordo arbitrale era
da ritenersi invalido in quanto discriminatorio e ad esso non si poteva nem-
meno applicare l’eccezione del « genuine occupational requirement ». In
estrema sintesi, per la Corte d’Appello, l’esercizio della funzione di arbitro
va equiparata a quella di ogni altro lavoratore impedendo percio` alle parti
ad un contratto internazionale (ma anche nazionale) di esprimere in pieno
(28) In argomento si rinvia, per un’analisi piu` approfondita, a MARRELLA, Human Ri-
ghts, Arbitration and Corporate Social Responsibility in the Law of International Trade, in
BENEDEK, DE FEYTER, MARRELLA, Economic Globalisation and Human Rights, Cambridge,
2007, 266-310; nonche´ JAKSIC, Arbitration and human rights, Frankfurt am Main, 2002, 17
ss.
(29) Causa C-54/07, Centrum voor Gelijkheid van Kansen en voor Racismebestrij-
ding v. Firma Feryan N.V., in Raccolta, 2008, I-1390.
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la loro scelta — legislativamente protetta — di comune accordo sulla per-
sona e qualita` dell’arbitro, cio` che costituisce, da sempre, l’essenza stessa
dell’arbitrato. Non stupisce quindi, che il caso in esame abbia suscitato
l’intervento nel procedimento de quo non solo del Principe Aga Khan ma
anche della London Court of International Arbitration e della stessa ICC:
l’intero mondo dell’arbitrato in Inghilterra ne avrebbe subito uno scon-
quasso fatale con il possibile risultato di una fuga generale da Londra e
dall’Inghilterra verso Paesi piu` arbitration friendly.
Non stupisce nemmeno quindi che la Corte Suprema inglese abbia in-
vertito radicalmente la rotta imboccata dalla Corte d’appello, cassandone la
pronuncia e rimettendo il timone nella direzione del commercio globale e
delle sue prassi antiche e moderne.
Rigettando in toto quella impostazione, la Corte Suprema ha concluso
peraltro che, nel caso di specie, non sussiste nemmeno motivo di ricorso
pregiudiziale alla Corte di Giustizia UE a fini interpretativi della Direttiva
n. 2000/78/CE del Consiglio, del 27 novembre 2000, vietando, inter alia,
le discriminazioni fondate sulla religione al fine di rendere effettivo il prin-
cipio della parita` di trattamento. L’attivita` di arbitro non rientra in quella di
« lavoratore » come definita dalla stessa Corte di Giustizia, inter alia, nel
caso Allonby (Causa, C-256-/01, 13 gennaio 2004), ove interpretando l’art.
141, n. 1, del Trattato CE, divenuto l’art. 157 del TFUE, la stessa Corte ha
rilevato che « si deve ricordare che la nozione di lavoratore nel diritto co-
munitario non e` univoca, ma varia a seconda del settore di applicazione
considerato... L’espressione “lavoratore”, ai sensi dell’art. 141, n. 1, CE
non e` espressamente definita nel Trattato CE » (punti 63-64). Ma ancor di
piu`, come ben riconosce la Corte Suprema inglese, e` fuor di dubbio che un
arbitro non e` una « persona che fornisca, per un certo periodo di tempo, a
favore di un’altra e sotto la direzione di quest’ultima, prestazioni in contro-
partita delle quali riceve una retribuzione » (punto 67 della sentenza citata).
L’arbitro, insomma, non e` certamente ne´ un lavoratore subordinato, ne´
tantomeno agisce sotto la direzione della parte che lo ha nominato; al con-
trario, operando sulla base di un contratto atipico, e` il giudice delle parti e
proprio perche´ e` neutrale, indipendente ed imparziale decide liberamente la
controversia con un lodo vincolante. Risultati, questi, largamente acquisiti
dalla dottrina specialistica italiana.
13. In conclusione, e` valida la clausola compromissoria che fissa,
con ragionevolezza, tra i requisiti degli arbitri indicati per comune volonta`
delle parti, quello dell’appartenenza ad una data comunita` religiosa. Le
parti dunque possono validamente stipulare nell’accordo arbitrale che uno
o piu` arbitri siano membri di una comunita` religiosa ben identificata ed il
cui culto sia legittimo rispetto alla lex loci arbitri.
La piu` alta istanza giurisdizionale inglese, infatti, ha scongiurato il ri-
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schio di qualificare discriminatorie, in base ad una interpretazione estensiva
della normativa giuslavoristica inglese, non solo le clausole praticate dalla
comunita` islamica presenti in Gran Bretagna, ma anche tutte quelle clau-
sole arbitrali ampiamente diffuse nel commercio internazionale che, inter
alia, prevedono determinati requisiti di competenza tecnica, nazionalita` o
anche di appartenenza religiosa degli arbitri. Corrispondendo ad esigenze
proprie al commercio internazionale, detti requisiti, ove liberamente pattuiti
dalle parti, sono ammessi nei regolamenti arbitrali internazionali piu` diffusi
quali quello della ICC o della LCIA o persino dell’UNCITRAL.
Per le stesse ragioni, la nomina di un arbitro la cui appartenenza reli-
giosa non sia quella specificamente pattuita ed indicata dalle parti nell’ac-
cordo arbitrale, costituisce una violazione dell’accordo arbitrale medesimo.
FABRIZIO MARRELLA
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